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NAMING THE LARGEST NUMBER
EXPLORING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN MATHEMATICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MATHEMATICS
DAVID SIMMONS
Abstract. What is the largest number accessible to the human imagination? The ques-
tion is neither entirely mathematical nor entirely philosophical. Mathematical formula-
tions of the problem fall into two classes: those that fail to fully capture the spirit of the
problem, and those that turn it back into a philosophical problem.
1. Introduction
“You have fifteen seconds. Using standard math notation, English words,
or both, name a single whole number–not an infinity–on a blank index card.
Be precise enough for any reasonable modern mathematician to determine
exactly what number you’ve named, by consulting only your card and, if
necessary, the published literature. Are you ready? Get set. Go.” – Scott
Aaronson, “Who can Name the Bigger Number?” 1
“The game of describing the largest integer, when played by experts, lapses
into a hopeless argument over legitimacy.” – Joel Spencer, “Large numbers
and unprovable theorems” [8]
This paper addresses the question: what is the best strategy in a “name the largest
number” contest such as the one described above? Of course, the answer depends on
what the rules of the contest are. Scott Aaronson’s idea of letting a “reasonable modern
mathematician” judge the entries might sound fair at first, but the answer to the question
of whether a given entry is a precise description of a number may depend on exactly
which mathematician you ask. It turns out that this dependence is not incidental but
fundamental, and slightly different standards for what counts as a valid entry give rise to
radically different strategies for winning the game.
One way to make precise the notion of a “precise description of a number” is to fix a
precise language, i.e. a language whose syntax and semantics are both precisely defined,
1http://www.scottaaronson.com/writings/bignumbers.html
1
2 DAVID SIMMONS
for describing numbers.2 A major goal of mathematics in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries was to create precise languages capable of expressing mathematical thought.
According to one view, which I will call the standard mathematicians’ view, this goal was
accomplished by the introduction in the early twentieth century of the language of (first-
order,3 classical,4 Zermelo–Fraenkel) set theory, which is allegedly capable of codifying all
mathematical facts. Another important language developed in the late nineteenth century
is (first-order, classical, Peano) arithmetic or number theory. Roughly speaking, set theory
is the language in which the fundamental objects of discourse are sets and the fundamen-
tal relation is membership, and number theory is the language in which the fundamental
objects of discourse are the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . (which we will hereafter refer
to simply as “numbers”) and the fundamental operations are addition and multiplication.
The syntaxes of both set theory and number theory have precise definitions, which are
given in any good textbook on mathematical logic. However, it is open to philosophical
debate whether the languages can be assigned precise semantics; see Sections 2.3, 4, and 5
for further discussion. Here I will attempt to take a neutral position with respect to this
debate, and merely analyze the consequences of any particular set of beliefs regarding the
preciseness of mathematical languages. In what follows, I will denote the languages of set
theory and number theory by the labels ST and NT, respectively.5 It is well-known that
NT has significantly less expressive power than ST in the sense that there is an algorithm
for translating sentences of NT into ST (which claims to preserve meaning or at least
truth-values), but not vice-versa.
2I warn the reader that the phrase ‘precise language’ is not standard terminology. While I will attempt
to use standard terminology wherever possible, in some cases this is not possible; for instance, the reason
I use the phrase ‘precise language’ is that the more standard phrase ‘formal language’ tends to refer only
to syntax and not to semantics. The concept of a formal language is amenable to mathematical definition,
whereas the concept of a precise language is not unless it is restricted in some way.
3In this paper I may seem to have an unjustified preference for first-order languages, as opposed to
things like second-order languages and languages that allow plural quantification. However, any second-
order language can be interpreted as a first-order language by the expedient of viewing the “properties” in
the original language as a type of object that one is allowed to quantify over. Although statements involving
plural quantification are more difficult to straightforwardly translate into first-order form, it seems to me
that in all cases where the original sentence is not ambiguous, it is possible to do so, and that moreover the
issues that concern philosophers regarding plural quantification have little do to with the issues considered
in this paper.
4Here ‘classical’ means “based on classical logic” – in particular, every statement in a classical language
is either true or false.
5The languages of set theory and number theory are sometimes denoted by the labels ZFC and PA,
respectively, as shorthand for ‘Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with Choice’ and ‘Peano Arithmetic’. These
labels are also used to denote standard axiom systems associated with these languages. However, in order
to emphasize the distinction between a language and an axiom system associated with that language, I
reserve the labels ZFC and PA for the axiom systems and I use the alternate labels ST and NT for the
languages. I chose new labels not based on mathematicians’ names in order to suggest that the languages
are somehow less “historically contingent” than the axiom systems, which I believe to be the case.
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If we have in mind a precise language, then we can define a precise largest number contest
by declaring that an entry to the contest is valid if and only if it is a term6 of the language
that names a number. We can write this in semi-formal mathematical language as follows:
Contest Definition 1.1. Let L be a precise language. The largest number contest of L,
denoted LNC(L) is the contest in which a valid entry is a term of L that succeeds at
referring to a number, and the score of the entry is the number it refers to. (In all of our
contests, the winner is the valid entry with the highest score.) We will denote the score of
an entry φ by [φ].
To many modern mathematicians, the largest number contest of ST will seem like the
obvious “first choice” for a largest number contest. On the other hand, many people are
uncertain as to whether set theory is really a precise language, but are more confident in
number theory; the largest number contest of NT may be a more natural “first choice”
for such people.7 Each of these contests has the disadvantage that it is not possible to
determine whether any given entry is valid in an algorithmic way. In fact, due to Tarski’s
theorem on the undefinability of truth (see Section 2) it is not even possible to formalize the
notion of a “valid entry” in the precise language being used for the contest (namely ST or
NT). Despite this lack of formalizability, it appears that the question of which entries are
valid is still legitimate and precise, assuming that the language used to define the contest
has in fact been given precise semantics.8 So it makes sense to ask what the best strategy
to use is, and in fact it is not too hard to find a strategy for the contest which is close to
being optimal. This strategy is based on the following theorem:9
Theorem 1.2 (Cf. Theorem C.4). Let L be either set theory or number theory. Then
for each number n, the phrase ‘the largest number that can be represented in L by a term
consisting of n symbols or fewer’ 10 can be translated into L as a term consisting of O(n)
symbols.11 This term, which we will denote by φL{n}, can be written explicitly.
Our strategy for the largest number contest of L can now be given as follows (assuming
that L is precise): first compute the largest number n such that the term φL{n} can fit
6The word ‘term’ is a technical term in mathematical logic whose closest non-technical analogue is
something like “a singular noun phrase that includes a definite article”. The key thing about terms is that
each term is intended to refer to a unique object.
7There is the minor technical issue that the terms of these languages have much less expressive power
than the languages themselves; this can be remedied by adding new rules for constructing terms that bring
the language’s terms on a par with the rest of the language in terms of expressive power, without increasing
the expressive power of the language as a whole. See Appendix A for details.
8Some mathematicians trained under the set theory framework may object that any question that
cannot be translated into ST should be suspected of being imprecise. However, this view is subject to the
counterargument that any reason to believe that ST is a precise language is also a reason to believe that
the question of which entries in LNC(ST) are valid is precise; on the other hand, if ST is not precise,
then it is not clear why one would use it as a standard of precision. Some further discussion may be found
in Section 5.
9The proofs of all theorems and corollaries, as well as the explanation of the axiom system they are
understood to be theorems of, are given in Appendices A-C, where more general versions of the theorems
are also stated.
10Cf. [8, Figs. 9-10], http://web.mit.edu/arayo/www/bignums.html
11Recall that O(n) is shorthand for ‘at most a constant times n’.
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onto the “index card” Scott Aaronson gives us to write our entry on (small handwriting
will come in handy here), and then write φL{n} on the card.
This strategy, which we will call the brute force strategy of L, is not necessarily optimal,
but it is nearly optimal in the sense that no strategy can beat it too badly. To be precise,
by the definition of φL{n}, any entry that scores higher than φL{n} necessarily uses at
least n+ 1 symbols to do so, which is not too much less than the O(n) symbols needed by
the brute force strategy. So if there is a better strategy, the difference is not overwhelming
in the sense that if one player plays with the brute force strategy and another player plays
with a better strategy, who wins may be determined more by who has more resources to
express their answer (for example, small handwriting) than it is by who is using the better
strategy. (This is the reason for the name “brute force strategy”.) The question of who
wins also starts to depend on the specific details of the formal definition of L; for example,
augmenting ST with the primitive ability to write ‘x /∈ y’ (“the set x is not a member of
the set y”) as shorthand for ‘¬x ∈ y’ (“it is not true that x is a member of y”), thus saving
a symbol, may make a crucial difference to the outcome. I will take the point of view that
any improvement that depends on such details is not a significant improvement, and thus
I will consider the “near-optimality” possessed by the brute force strategy to be essentially
the same as optimality. (This is a standard practice in many areas of mathematics and
computer science.)
An obvious objection is that the largest number contest of L, though precise, does not
stay true to the “spirit” of being a “name the largest number” contest. For example, a
description of the term φL{n} in terms of n could perhaps be made to fit on an index
card,12 and then one could simply write ‘and my number is the number denoted by the
term φL{10100}’.13 We will call this the indirect strategy, and we note that the entry it
produces is not a valid entry to LNC(L), since it is an English description of a number
rather than a term of the language L. Since 10100 is much larger than the number of
symbols that any physically realistic entry could have, in a largest number contest in which
the entry produced by the indirect strategy is considered valid, it wins against any entry
which is valid in LNC(L). However, it seems that the indirect strategy should be allowed if
we follow Aaronson’s principle that a player only needs to submit an entry that is “precise
enough for any reasonable modern mathematician to determine exactly what number [the
player has] named” (assuming, of course, that L is a precise language to begin with).
The objection becomes more poignant if we consider the fact that the hypothetical
entry of the previous paragraph is not only perfectly precise, but also has the property
that it can be converted into a valid entry to LNC(L) given a sufficient (albeit physically
unrealistically large) amount of time and effort. Concentrating on this part of the objection,
we can imagine a second contest in which the entries are not required to be terms of the
language L, but are allowed to be merely descriptions of terms. The crucial question now
12If this paper counts as “published literature” then one could simply write ‘φL{10100}’ together with
the appropriate citation.
13Alternatively, one could simply write the original English phrase ‘the largest number that can be
represented in L by a term consisting of 10100 symbols or fewer’ on the index card, as is done for example
in [8]. However, the point is that the fact that Theorem 1.2 specifies a procedure for (eventually) translating
this phrase into L might be thought of as adding some “legitimacy” to the indirect strategy, as described
in the next paragraph.
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becomes what sorts of descriptions of these terms are allowed. One possibility would be to
allow these descriptions to be themselves terms of the language L, or perhaps terms of a
different precise language that has the ability to talk about strings of symbols.14 However, it
is not hard to see that the “brute force strategy” described above can be trivially modified
to deal with this new game: instead of writing φL{n}, write ‘φL{m}, where m =’φL{n}
for an appropriate value of n. Things get more interesting if we look at other ways of
describing strings. For now at least, let us take the conservative viewpoint that in order
to count for the purposes of the contest, a description of a string should contain enough
information that it is possible to use it to algorithmically generate the string it describes,
although this may take an arbitrarily long time. Semi-formally:
Contest Definition 1.3. Let L be a precise language. The largest number contest of
L allowing indirect entries, denoted LNC∗(L), is the contest in which a valid entry is an
algorithm (written in some fixed programming language the details of which are irrelevant15)
that succeeds at (eventually) computing a term of L that refers to a number. If the
algorithm fails to terminate by returning a string as its output, or if the string it returns
is not a term of L referring to a number, then the entry is considered invalid. The score of
a valid entry is the number that its output refers to.
Taking our cue from the strategy that “won” LNC(L), a natural strategy for LNC∗(L)
is to first find an algorithm that computes a very large number n, and then to combine it
with a second algorithm that computes the string φL{n} given n as input. However, this
leaves open the question of how to write an algorithm that computes a very large number.
It is worth listing this as a separate largest number contest:
Contest Definition 1.4. The Busy Beaver contest16 is the contest in which a valid entry
is an algorithm that succeeds at computing a number, and the score of the entry is its
output.
It is clear that any strategy for the Busy Beaver contest whose score is n can be converted
into a strategy for LNC∗(L) whose score is [φL{n}], and that if a strategy is optimal or
nearly optimal for the Busy Beaver contest, then its converted version is nearly optimal
for LNC∗(L). Thus, we can avoid dealing with LNC∗(L) directly and instead analyze the
Busy Beaver contest in its place.
14It is well-known that the theory of strings of symbols can be translated into both ST and NT.
15Note that a programming language is a particular type of precise language: a language for precisely
specifying mathematical algorithms. In this paper a program is understood to be a description of an
algorithm in a programming language.
16The Busy Beaver contest is inspired by the Busy Beaver function. Given a number n as input, the
Busy Beaver function returns the largest number that is the output of some algorithm that can be written
in at most n symbols (in some fixed programming language). Equivalently, the value of the Busy Beaver
function at n is the largest number computed by any possible entry to the Busy Beaver contest written
in at most n symbols. (Technical note: The classical Busy Beaver function is defined not in terms of
the number of symbols in a description of an algorithm, but rather in terms of the number of states in a
(one-tape, two-symbol) Turing machine representation of the algorithm. However, the length of a program
encoding an algorithm is a much more natural metric of the algorithm’s complexity than the number of
states in a Turing machine representation, and I have no qualms with saying that the “true” Busy Beaver
function is the one described above.)
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Remark. Any strategy for the Busy Beaver contest can also be converted into a strategy
for LNC(NT) or LNC∗(ST) with the same score as the original strategy, via the fact that
phrases of the form ‘the output of the algorithm α, if it exists’ can be translated into NT
and ST. However, NT and ST are capable of naming much larger numbers, and scores in
the Busy Beaver contest will in general be much lower than scores in the largest number
contests of NT and ST.
It turns out that the best strategy for the Busy Beaver contest is very different from the
best strategy for LNC(ST) or LNC(NT). To describe this strategy, we need the notion
of an axiom system for a precise language. An axiom system A for a precise language L,
also known as an axiomatization of L, is a list of axioms and inference rules. An axiom is a
sentence of L which is either considered obviously true, or merely hypothesized to be true,17
while an inference rule is a syntactic rule for creating new sentences of L from previous
ones, with the understanding that the inference rule is supposed to formalize some method
of reasoning, in the sense that the previous sentences represent “prior beliefs” and the new
sentences represent “deductions” or “conclusions formed using the reasoning method”. A
list of claims of L is said to be a syntactic proof in A if each claim on the list is either
an axiom or can be created from the previous ones using some inference rule. We use the
phrase ‘syntactic proof’ to distinguish between a syntactic proof and a semantic proof of
a claim, which is an argument that convinces us, or would convince us, that the claim is
true. An axiom system aspires for its syntactic proofs to be also semantic proofs; when
this is the case we call the axiom system valid. The standard axiomatizations of ST and
NT are the Zermelo–Fraenkel axiom system for set theory and the Peano axiom system for
number theory, which we will denote by ZFC and PA, respectively (for “Zermelo–Fraenkel
set theory with Choice” and “Peano Arithmetic”, respectively).
In what follows we consider a pair (L,A) where L is a precise language and A is a
valid axiom system for L. In order to prove results about (L,A) we must make some
additional assumptions about the structure of L; specifically, we will assume that L is
a proposition/term language as defined in Appendix A. Note that both ST and NT are
proposition/term languages in this sense.
Theorem 1.5 (Cf. Theorem C.5). Let A be a valid axiomatization of a precise proposi-
tion/term language L such that all sentences of the form ‘the algorithm α eventually halts’,
where α is a concrete algorithm, can be translated into L. Then for each n, there is a
program of length O(log(n)) encoding an algorithm that succeeds at computing fA{n}, the
largest number which is the output of an algorithm that can be proven to halt via a proof
in A of length at most n. This program, which we will denote by αA{n}, can be written
explicitly.
Remark. Note that the length of the program αA{n} is only O(log(n)) rather than O(n).
The reason for this is that αA{n} only needs to describe n in sufficient detail that it can be
17A major difference between the mathematical and philosophical communities is that mathematicians
generally view axioms as “hypotheses” while philosophers usually view axioms as “obvious or self-evident
truths”. Furthermore, while some mathematical hypotheses are considered likely to be true, others are
introduced purely for the sake of argument.
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computed (for example by giving its binary or decimal representation), rather than needing
to contain n symbols to start with.
Our strategy for the Busy Beaver contest can now be given succinctly as follows: submit
the program αA{10100}. This is feasible because logψL,A{n} is small enough that a program
of length O(log(10100)) is ordinarily short enough that it can be physically implemented.18
Although theoretically one may submit the program αA{n} for much larger values of n,
it turns out that it is not worth it to do so because gains from this sort of change are
overwhelmed by much larger easy improvements elsewhere, such as replacing (L,A) by the
metasystem (L+ 1, A+ 1) described below.
Unlike the brute force strategy, the above strategy, which we will call the axiomatic
strategy of A, is not nearly optimal. In fact, there is no humanly understandable nearly
optimal strategy, since any nearly optimal entry will appear to us as a nearly random
sequence of symbols; see Appendix E for details. However, if the language L and the
axiom system A are chosen wisely, the strategy can have a different type of optimality,
namely relative epistemological optimality. The idea is that even though there may be many
possible valid entries that would win against the axiomatic strategy if they were submitted
as competitors, humanity may never be able to determine which of these entries are in fact
valid. So if you are playing against human opponents that prefer to only submit entries
that they believe are valid, then with the axiomatic strategy you may have a reasonable
shot at winning.
Suppose that Alice and Bob are human players, and that Alice has just submitted an
entry αA{10100} using the axiomatic strategy, while Bob is going to submit an entry α0
that he believes is valid. Presumably, this means that Bob has executed (either internally
or externally19) some chain of reasoning whose conclusion is that α0 is valid. Although it is
theoretically possible that this chain of reasoning cannot be formalized in any axiom system,
it seems plausible that in practice it usually can be, and that in fact there is usually an
axiom system capable of formalizing Bob’s reasoning which is not too much more powerful
than an axiom system that Bob explicitly endorses. Moreover, arguments that can be
formalized in one axiom system also tend to be able to be formalized in more powerful
axiom systems, so as long as the axiom system that Bob’s reasoning can be formalized in is
less powerful than Alice’s preselected axiom system A, then Bob’s reasoning can probably
also be formalized in A as well. Finally, if we formalize Bob’s reasoning in the axiom
system A, then we may expect that the formalization of Bob’s reasoning will not be too
much longer than a formalization of his reasoning in English (or another natural language);
all that is needed is that the ratio between the two lengths will not be more than (for
example) 1050. On the other hand, due to physical limitations that apply regardless of
18Of course, this depends on the constant implied by the O(·) notation, but it appears not to be too
large.
19An example of external execution of reasoning is a computer-assisted proof. Alternatively, we could
say that a human who comes to believe the conclusion of a computer-assisted proof is applying internal
reasoning using the belief that the external world (and in particular the computer performing the calcu-
lations used in the proof) operates according to the laws of physics. However, according to this second
way of looking at things the chain of reasoning cannot properly be described as mathematical or strictly
deductive. Thus the second way of looking at things makes the situation more difficult to analyze, which
is why I stick to considering a computed-assisted proof as external reasoning.
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whether Bob’s reasoning is internal or external, it is reasonable to expect that we can
formalize his reasoning in English using no more than (for example) 1050 symbols, and
thus that we can formalize his reasoning in the axiom system A using no more than 10100
symbols. If this turns out to be the case, then α0 can be proven to halt in A using reasoning
encoded in no more than 10100 symbols. Thus the output of α0 is at most fA{10100}, which
is the output of Alice’s entry αA{10100}. So Alice will win.20 21
In order to make the analysis fair, I should also address the question of why Alice might
believe that her entry is valid. Its validity cannot be proven in the axiom system A in a
physically realistic timeframe, since if it could then Alice would win if she played against
herself, which makes no sense. However, it turns out that there is a precise language and
corresponding axiom system not too much more powerful than the pair (L,A) capable of
formalizing the reasoning used in the proof of Theorem 1.5: namely, the pair (L+1, A+1),
where
• L + 1 is the metalanguage of L, a precise proposition/term language capable of
expressing the notions of truth and reference with respect to L in the sense that
claims of the form ‘φ is a true sentence of L’ and terms of the form ‘the object
denoted by the L-term t’ can be straightforwardly translated into L+ 1; and
• A + 1 is the metasystem of A, a natural axiomatization of L + 1 which formalizes
the assumption that the axiom system A is valid as well as standard beliefs and
methods of reasoning about strings of symbols.
(See Appendices A and B for more details.) Thus, Alice may come to believe that her entry
is valid using reasoning that can be formalized in the axiom system A+ 1.
In what follows, we will metonymically refer to a pair (L,A), where L is a precise language
and A is an axiomatization of it, as an axiom system, and to the pair (L+1, A+1) as the
metasystem of (L,A).
Corollary 1.6 (Cf. Corollary C.6). Let (L1, A1) and (L2, A2) be valid axiom systems with
the translation property hypothesized in Theorem 1.5, and suppose that (L1, A1) is at least
as powerful as the metasystem (L2+1, A2+1) in the sense that all proofs of (L2+1, A2+1)
can be translated into (L1, A1). Then in the Busy Beaver contest, the axiomatic strategy
of (L1, A1) wins agains the axiomatic strategy of (L2, A2) (assuming both axiom systems as
well as the algorithm for translating one into the other are small enough that they could be
physically implemented).
20The philosophical argument given in this paragraph is significant not for its rigor, which is practically
non-existent, but because it seems to mesh well with what we expect. It seems to me that if largest number
contests were actually held, many of them would work in exactly this way.
21It is also interesting to ask what might happen if Bob bases his beliefs on probabilistic or heuristic
reasoning. For example, many of the arguments for accepting the validity of strong axiomatizations of set
theory (i.e. large cardinal axioms) are based on such reasoning. Recently there has been much interest in
the difficult question of how to formalize probabilistic reasoning about mathematical concepts (see e.g. [2]
and the references therein), but it is not clear to me that any of the frameworks proposed so far are capable
of modeling (for example) the standard heuristic arguments in favor of measurable cardinals (see [4, 5]).
Thus, if Bob bases his belief that his entry is valid on probabilistic reasoning, it may be necessary to find
an “intermediate axiom” which Bob would also accept on the basis of the same probabilistic reasoning,
which implies that Bob’s entry is valid (in the axiomatic framework Bob already accepts), and which is a
consequence of the axiom system A chosen by Alice, in order for the argument to apply.
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Consequently, the key question to ask about the contestants to the Busy Beaver contest
is: what is the weakest axiom system capable of formalizing their reasoning? If Alice uses
reasoning incapable of being formalized in an axiom system A capable of formalizing Bob’s
reasoning, this may lead her to believe that the axiom system A is valid, in which case she
can win simply by playing its axiomatic strategy. If both players’ logic is best described
in terms of the same axiomatic framework, then we are led to the consideration of another
type of largest number contest.
A common defect in all of the largest number contests considered above is that there is
no clear way for human judges to determine whether any given entry is valid or not. Even
if a term φ refers to a number (and is therefore a valid entry to the first contest), there
may be no proof that φ refers to a number in any axiom system that the judges accept as
valid. However, the optimal strategies for the largest number contests of ST and NT, i.e.
the brute force strategies of ST and NT, are relatively uncontroversial (since the proof of
Theorem 1.2 may be considered valid by the judges) so the issue does not matter too much
for those contests. In the Busy Beaver contest the situation is different. Theoretically a
player could run the algorithm described in his entry to show that it halts, but by design
this would take an extremely large amount of time. The contest may be modified by adding
the requirement that contestants must submit, as an addendum to their entry, a proof that
their entry is valid. Then whatever reasoning convinces the contestants of the validity of
their entry could also be shown to the judges.
This new requirement brings us back around almost full circle: like the question of what
constitutes a precise description of a number, the question of what constitutes a valid
proof that an entry is valid is subject to philosophical debate, unless we describe a precise
criterion, such as validity in a fixed axiom system, for what counts as a proof. But if we
introduce such a structure, then as before it turns out that the best strategy is a brute
force strategy:
Contest Definition 1.7. Let (L,A) be as in Theorem 1.5. The Busy Beaver proof contest
of (L,A) is the contest in which a valid entry is a pair of the form (α, ρ), where α is an
algorithm and ρ is a proof in A that α succeeds at computing a number, and the score of
the entry (α, ρ) is the output of α.
Theorem 1.8 (Cf. Theorem C.11). Let L be either set theory or number theory, and
correspondingly let A be either ZFC or PA.22 Then for each n, the nth case of Theorem
1.5 can be (syntactically23) proven in A using reasoning encoded in at most O(n2 log(n))
characters.24 The proof in A, which we will denote by ρA{n}, can be written explicitly.
The brute force strategy for the Busy Beaver proof contest of (L,A) can then be given
as follows: First compute the largest number n such that the ρA{n} is short enough to be
22The proof of this theorem is also valid for a much broader class of languages and axiom systems; see
Appendices A-C for details.
23If the axiom system (L,A) is valid, then this syntactic proof is also a semantic proof.
24This number is possibly somewhat sensitive to the exact definition of a “proof in the axiom system
A”. Though many definitions of the word “proof” exist in the literature, this theorem is based on the
definition of “proof” described in Appendix B, which is intended to closely model the notion of “proof” in
standard mathematical practice, including automated proof checkers.
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submitted as an addendum to the entry αA{n}, and then submit the pair (αA{n}, ρA{n})
as an entry. (Note that the length of ρA{n} is the limiting factor here; αA{n} is much
shorter.) Like the brute force strategies of the largest number contests of ST and NT,
this strategy is nearly optimal in the sense that no other valid strategy can beat it too
badly. However, in this case the near-optimality is a little bit worse in the sense that the
number of symbols needed is O(n2 log(n)) rather than O(n). It turns out that if we consider
proofs that incorporate “shorthand” corresponding to the common mathematical practice
of giving “definitions”, then the number of symbols needed can be reduced to O(n log(n)).
Like the largest number contests of ST and NT, an objection can be raised to the
various Busy Beaver proof contests on the grounds that they are not “real” largest number
contests: for any such contest, it is easy to describe entries that “should be” accepted as
valid since their corresponding proofs use methods of reasoning just a little bit outside of
the axiomatic framework that has been fixed for the judging, which are easily seen to win
against all valid entries by a large margin. However, we seem to have exhausted all our
“possible moves” for getting away from the problem (though we will see later that this is
not quite true), so perhaps it is best to just admit defeat: there is no good way to formalize
the largest number contest.
To be specific, an important thesis of this paper is the following:
Thesis 1.9. For any precise largest number contest, the best strategy is either a brute force
strategy or an axiomatic strategy.
I will not argue for this thesis other than by pointing to the lack of counterexamples
despite encountering a broad range of precise largest number contests. The real test will
be to see whether a counterexample will be found in the future.
In contests where the optimal strategy is a brute force strategy, there is always the feeling
that the spirit of the contest has been lost since it is easy to give descriptions of numbers
that are just as precise as the implicit descriptions of numbers provided by valid entries
in the contest, that nevertheless win against all legitimate entries. Moreover, the fact that
victory in the contest is tied to merely being able to physically write down a certain se-
quence of symbols, when we all know in advance exactly what those symbols will be, makes
a mockery of what was supposed to be a test of wits. On the other hand, in contests
where the best strategy is axiomatic, it is impossible to determine which entries are valid
in an algorithmic way, and this problem is most conspicuous exactly when we look at the
strategies that appear to have the best chance of winning, namely the axiomatic strategies
of the most powerful axiom systems for the most expressive languages. In general the
plausibility of an axiom system is inversely proportional to its power, so this leads us to
the uncomfortable situation where the strategies which are the best if valid are also those
which are the least likely to be valid, and the most difficult to justify.
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2. Philosophical largest number contests
One reaction to the difficulties of formalizing the largest number problem is to eschew
formalization and instead consider a different, more “philosophical”, approach to the chal-
lenge of implementing a largest number contest. Namely, we can take literally the idea
of judging the entries according to the standard of whether a “reasonable modern mathe-
matician” would find them to be precise. The fact that different mathematicians may give
different answers to this question can be dealt with by specifying in advance who will judge
the contest. Alternatively, we may divide mathematicians into broad classes based on their
philosophy of mathematics, and allow each philosophical school to elect a panel of judges
to represent it. Each entry could then spark a philosophical debate within the panel as to
whether or not it is valid. Semi-formally:
Contest Definition 2.1. Let X be a school of thought in the philosophy of mathematics.
Then the largest number contest run by adherents of X is the contest in which an entry
consists of a natural language description of a number together with a philosophical argu-
ment defending the premise that the description in fact uniquely identifies a number. The
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entry is valid if the adherents of X agree with the argument, and the winner is whichever
entry the adherents of X believe describes the largest number.
Remark. In practice, the matter of deciding which entry describes the largest number is
much more straightforward than the matter of deciding which entries are valid.
Obviously, largest number contests run by philosophers are not precise in the same way
that the contests of the previous section are. Thus, instead of immediately describing
what the optimal strategy is, I will discuss possible strategies for this contest for various
schools of thought over the next few sections. In particular, I will argue that in most cases
Thesis 1.9 applies to this contest as well, in the following sense: With enough “nudging”,
it is possible to convince the adherents of any school of thought that their largest number
contest can be reduced to a largest number contest in which either a brute force strategy
or an axiomatic strategy is optimal. The idea is that there are only a few “free variables”
in the interpretation of a philosophy that need to be pinned down before its largest number
contest becomes a precise largest number contest.
Actually, most philosophers will find the idea that a philosophical largest number con-
test can be won with a brute force strategy to be abhorrent, since it appears to mean
that our powers of description are dependent on our ability to physically instantiate large
descriptions of numbers, rather than merely to precisely describe such descriptions. This
means that in practice philosophical largest number contests are usually won by axiomatic
strategies. Of course, an axiom system is also the sort of thing that it is possible to give
philosophical arguments for and against. This leads to the following family of contests:
Contest Definition 2.2. Let X be a school of thought in the philosophy of mathematics,
and let L be a language that adherents of X believe is precise. Then the strongest axiom
contest for L run by adherents of X is the contest in which an entry consists of an axiom-
atization of L (given either informally or as a list of axioms and inference rules) together
with a philosophical argument defending the premise that the axiom system is valid. The
entry is valid if the adherents of X agree with the argument, and the winner is whichever
entry the adherents of X believe describes the most powerful axiom system.
Again, I will describe possible strategies for various strongest axiom contests over the
next few sections. Note that the largest number and strongest axiom contests will have to
be treated as different contests at first, even though I will argue that usually the largest
number contest reduces to the strongest axiom contest.
Without any information about what school of thought is running the contest, it is not
possible to be very precise about what constitutes a good strategy for either of these types
of contests. Nevertheless, it turns out that there is a broad class of strategies that tend
to be good strategies for the first type of contest. Namely, one type of possible entry to a
philosophical largest number contest is a description of a (hopefully) precise language L for
naming numbers together with a term of L which is supposed to refer to a number. Once
the language L is fixed, then the philosophical largest number contest reduces to the largest
number contest of L, a precise largest number contest. However, the appropriate strategic
response to this depends on what kind of language L is. In Appendix A I will introduce
a class of languages called proposition/term languages, or PT languages, which have a
regular structure designed to be compatible with the ideas in this paper. This structure
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is somewhat different from, and more general than, the usual structure of the languages
considered in mathematical logic. It appears to more closely resemble the structure of
natural language.
2.1. Classical languages. For the purposes of this paper, a classical language is a propo-
sition/term language that is assumed to satisfy25 the law of excluded middle, which essen-
tially claims that every sentence of the language is either true or false (more precisely, every
sentence whose terms all have referents). We will call languages that in fact satisfy the law
of excluded middle definite languages ; thus, a classical language is one which speakers of
the language treat as definite. The notion of definiteness is closely related to the concept of
preciseness, but in what follows I will argue that it is important to treat them as separate
notions, by describing indefinite languages that are in certain respects just as precise as
classical definite ones, but which nevertheless cannot be understood sensibly as definite
languages.
If L is a classical language, then by an appropriate generalization of Theorem 1.2 (see
Theorem C.4), it has a brute force strategy. Now if L is part of an entry to a philosophical
largest number contest, then the obvious way to complete the entry is by using the brute
force strategy of L. The following theorem shows that this linguistic strategy has the
property that it increases in strength as the expressive power of the language increases:
Theorem 2.3 (Cf. Theorem C.9). Let L1 and L2 be two precise proposition/term lan-
guages, at least one of which is classical, and suppose that L1 can reproduce the metalan-
guage L2+1, i.e. that the metalanguage L2+ 1 can be translated into L1. Then for any n,
the phrase ‘the largest number that can be represented in L2 using at most n symbols’ can
be translated into L1 as a term of length O(log(n)) which succeeds at naming a number.
Thus, in any philosophical largest number contest in which both strategies are considered
valid, the linguistic strategy of L1 will win against the linguistic strategy of L2.
For example, it follows from well-known facts26 that set theory ST can reproduce the
metalanguage of number theory NT, so Theorem 2.3 shows that the brute force strategy
of ST wins against the brute force strategy of NT. As another example, one way to phrase
Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth (see [9] and Theorem A.14) is to say that
no classical language is capable of reproducing its own metalanguage, and this is reflected
in Theorem 2.3 in the fact that no language can describe a larger number than the largest
number it describes.
2.2. Selfmeta languages. Despite Tarski’s theorem, it turns out to be possible to create
proposition/term languages that are capable of reproducing their own metalanguages, as
long as they are not required to be classical. We will call a proposition/term language which
is capable of reproducing its own metalanguage selfmeta. The most well-known examples
25Here, I use the phrase ‘assumed to satisfy’ to mark assumptions made by the users of a language
without passing judgement on whether those assumptions are accurate or not. In general, those who
disagree with the implicit premises of a language will not be considered to be valid users of the language,
though they can still talk about the language.
26Specifically, the fact that set theory asserts that there is a set of all numbers, together with stan-
dard methods for formalizing in ST the notions of truth and reference for a language whose domain of
quantification is a fixed set.
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of selfmeta languages are Kripke extensions of classical languages (see Section 3), which
are essentially selfmeta “by definition” in the sense that they have primitive notation for
expressing their own concept of truth. However, we will see in the next two sections that
there are other natural examples of selfmeta languages.
This leads to the question: what is the best strategy for the largest number contest of a
selfmeta language (in the sense of Definition 1.1)? It turns out to be an axiomatic strategy,
due to the following theorem:
Theorem 2.4 (Cf. Theorem C.7). Let L∗ be a precise selfmeta language, and let A be
a valid axiomatization of a precise proposition/term language L with at least as much
expressive power as L∗ (L = L∗ is allowed). Then for each n, the phrase ‘the largest
number named by any term t such that A proves that t succeeds at naming a number
using reasoning encoded in less than n symbols’ can be translated into L∗ as a term of
length O(log(n)) which succeeds at naming a number. This term, which we will denote by
ψL∗,A{10100}, can be written explicitly. The proof of this theorem (for fixed L∗, L, A) can be
formalized in the axiom system A+ 1.
For any axiom system (L,A), we define the axiomatic strategy of A for the largest number
contest of L∗ to be to submit the term ψL∗,A{10100} given in the above theorem. A player
using the axiomatic strategy of A strategy will win against any player submitting an entry
whose validity can be proven in A, and by Theorem 2.4, the validity of the axiomatic
strategy of A can be proven in A + 1. This leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 2.5 (Cf. Corollary C.8). Let L∗ be a selfmeta precise language, and let (L1, A1)
and (L2, A2) be valid axiom systems with at least as much expressive power as L∗. Suppose
in addition that the axiom system (L1, A1) is at least as powerful as the metasystem (L2 +
1, A2 + 1). Then in the largest number contest of L∗, the axiomatic strategy of A1 wins
against the axiomatic strategy of A2.
Note that Theorem 2.4 shows that a philosophical largest number contest can be “hi-
jacked” if the judges of the contest are lax enough. Namely, the adherents of a school of
thought X may decide that they believe that a certain selfmeta language L∗ is precise, and
then they may decide to declare that an entry to their contest is valid if and only if it is a
term of L∗ that succeeds at naming a number. If the judges do not impose an additional
requirement that the entry must be accompanied by a semantic proof that the entry names
a number, then the contest can be won by adherents of other schools of thought that ad-
mit more expressive languages and correspondingly more powerful axiom systems. If these
other philosophers’ languages are valid, or at least valid enough that their corresponding
axiomatic strategies are valid, then they will win the contest.
It is natural for the adherents of X to prevent this “hijacking” by stipulating that entries
to their largest number contest must be accompanied by semantic proofs that they name
numbers. If they impose this requirement, then their largest number contest reduces to the
strongest axiom contest of the selfmeta language L∗ run by adherents of X . In particular,
this method of judging entries does not trivialize the largest number contest, so philosophers
may find it acceptable. In fact, I will argue that any coherent position on the philosophy
of mathematics can eventually be formalized into a stable selfmeta language, causing its
largest number contest to reduce to the strongest axiom contest of that language:
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Thesis 2.6. Any coherent position on the philosophy of mathematics can be formalized into
a “maximal” selfmeta language which adherents of the philosophy should accept as precise.
By contrast, the largest axiom contest can never stabilize in this way. There are two
reasons for this. First of all, anyone who accepts the validity of an axiom system A starts
to use reasoning that cannot be formalized in A, but can be reasonably formalized in the
metasystem A+ 1. Thus it is natural to ask him whether he accepts the validity of A+ 1.
If not, then it becomes difficult for him to justify his own reasoning as valid, and if so, then
the axiomatic strategy of A+1 beats the axiomatic strategy of A and thus the contest has
not stabilized.27 Secondly, the largest number proof contest of a selfmeta language with
respect to any fixed axiomatization has a “brute force” strategy, so it will be avoided by
philosophers who believe in “mind over matter”:
Contest Definition 2.7. The largest number proof contest of an axiomatization A of a
precise proposition/term language L is the contest in which a valid entry is a pair of the
form (ψ, ρ), where ψ is a term in L and ρ is a proof in A that ψ succeeds at naming a
number, and the score of the entry (ψ, ρ) is the number named by ψ.
Theorem 2.8. Let A be an axiomatization of a selfmeta language L = L∗. Then for each
n, the nth case of Theorem 2.4 can be proven in A using reasoning encoded in at most O(n)
symbols. The proof in A, which we will denote by ρL,A{n}, can be given explicitly.
The brute force strategy for the largest number proof contest of (L,A) can now be given
as follows: First compute the largest number n such that ρL,A{n} can be submitted as an
addendum to the entry ψL,A{n} (without exceeding physical or imposed limits), and then
submit the pair (ψL,A{n}, ρL,A{n}) as an entry. As usual, this strategy is nearly optimal
in the sense that no other valid strategy can beat it too badly.
Note that if L is a selfmeta language and A is an axiomatization of L, then A+1 can be
viewed either as an axiomatization of L+1 or an axiomatization of L. Since L is capable of
reproducing L + 1, both languages have equal expressive power and thus axiomatizations
of either one can be viewed as axiomatizations of the other.
2.3. Plan for the next few sections. In what follows, I will attempt to describe entries
to the largest number and/or strongest axiom contests corresponding to various schools of
thought in the philosophy of mathematics. For clarity I introduce the following terms:
• Set realism is the view that it is possible to talk precisely about sets, understood in
the classical sense according to which some sets are undescribable even in principle.
• Descriptionalism is the opposite view, that all mathematical objects should be
describable at least in principle, even if it would take an extremely large (but finite)
amount of time or resources to describe them.
• Number realism is the view that it is possible to talk precisely about natural num-
bers, understood in the classical sense according to which large numbers are inher-
ently no different from small ones.
27This is analogous to the fact that any strategy in a largest number contest can be beaten by a
modification of itself which says to add 1 to the number described by the original strategy, if such a
modification is valid.
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• Ultrafinitism is the opposite view, that the classical concept of a “natural number”
is incoherent from a philosophical point of view.
Obviously, these labels are very broad, and it is possible to for schools of thought to get
much more specific about their beliefs. In particular, the category of “descriptionalist
number realism” includes the schools of thought traditionally known as “constructivism”,
“intuitionism”, and “predicativism”. However, I will find it convenient to avoid talking too
much about about the relationship between the philosophical stances that one might take
in response to a largest number contest and pre-existing philosophical schools, though I
will mention similarities where they exist.
Remark. The label ‘realism’ should not be taken to indicate that adherents of either set
realism or number realism are required to subscribe to philosophical realism, the view that
words and phrases like ‘the number 5’, ‘the set of odd numbers’, and ‘greenness’ refer to
“real things” that “exist” “independently of the mind”.28 A mathematical realist may or
may not believe that the entities he talks about “actually exist”; he only needs to believe
that it is possible to talk about them precisely.
Out of the two types of mathematical realism, set realism is more closely connected with
philosophical realism, since arguments in favor of set realism often presuppose philosophical
realism. On the other hand, there is a tension between the two types of realism in that
philosophical realism asserts that e.g. “greenness” exists as greenness, while set realism
asserts that it exists as the set of all things that are green.29 This tension is highlighted by
the fact that set realists believe that some sets are undefinable and undescribable, whereas
it is not clear that a “property” or “universal” in the sense of philosophical realism could
ever be in-principle undescribable. These kinds of considerations may lead a philosophical
realist to reject set realism in favor of descriptionalism.
Before delving into the details of how I think set realists and number realists might be
able to judge their largest number and strongest axiom contests in a philosophically de-
fensible way, I will say a few words regarding some general objections to the project I am
undertaking:
The pragmatist/formalist/ultrafinitist objection. Some mathematicians may object that
it does not make sense to talk about the truth or falsity of mathematical sentences unless
we specify an axiom system according to which alleged proofs or disproofs of these sen-
tences are to be judged. There are a few natural objections to this point of view. First
of all, the question arises of whether the truth that can be talked about once we have
28The scare quotes may allow the reader to guess what my view on the subject is: I am not sure what it
would mean to say that a mathematical entity “exists” or “does not exist”. Certainly mathematical entities
are not typical examples of the category of “things that exist”, but this appears to be a very loosely defined
category (even more loose than the category of things that can be precisely talked about), and is there any
point in trying to define precise boundaries for it? In the absence of any motivating question, it appears
that the answer is no.
29This way of putting things is in some ways an oversimplification, since a set realist may deny that the
notion of greenness is well-defined enough for there to be a set of all things that are green. This observation
highlights the differences between the set-realist and philosophical-realist perspectives.
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specified an axiom system is conceptually independent of provability in that axiom sys-
tem, or whether to say that a sentence is true simply means that it can be proven in the
axiom system. If it is conceptually independent, then it is not clear why it cannot be
talked about independently of the axiom system. On the other hand, if truth is nothing
more than syntactic provability (a view known as formalism), then it is not immediately
clear what it means to say that a sentence is syntactically provable, since the claim that
a given sentence is syntactically provable is usually considered to be itself a mathematical
statement (asserting the existence of a syntactic proof), and so it is not immediately clear
how such a statement could be meaningful unless there is some theory according to which
at least some mathematical statements are meaningful independent of their provability in
any axiom system. However, the notion of syntactic provability can be instead interpreted
in the social sense: as the ability of mathematicians to construct a syntactic proof. (In
practice, this ability is almost completely hypothetical since mathematicians rely nearly
exclusively on informal descriptions of syntactic proofs. However, there appears to be no
reason that this should constitute a philosophical problem for formalism.) This raises the
question of what constitutes a syntactic proof, and it can again be understood in a social
sense: as the question of a proof-checker “following convention” would (hypothetically) find
an “error” or “non sequitur” in the alleged proof.
The objection to this view is that our intuition suggests that the question of whether an
alleged syntactic proof is in fact a syntactic proof seems to be just as precise as the simpler
questions of which it is composed, such as the question of whether or not two given symbols
in the alleged syntactic proof are the same symbol, and moreover these simpler questions
seem to be perfectly precise. If so, then this principle of “conservation of precision under
finite quantification” is enough to get us a very rudimentary version of number realism along
with a corresponding largest number contest (see Section 4.1). However, one may object
that the new question is not quite as precise as the old one, since if we create machines
for checking syntactic proofs, then the probability that two machines will give different
answers gets larger as the alleged proof gets longer. Eventually the probability will be
large enough that the question of what the “right” answer is will no longer be precise (or
so the argument goes). The obvious objection to this is that we ordinarily think that the
reason that two machines usually give the same answer is because there is a “right” answer
for both of them to give, not the other way around. It is not obvious how to explain this
fact other than by thinking of the machine calculations as approximations of an abstract
calculation which remains precise regardless of physical implementability.
If even the principle of conservation of precision under finite quantification is rejected,
then there is not much sense in talking about largest number contests, because on such
a view it is not clear that the concept of a “number” is coherent enough to be worth
talking about. Namely, one can talk about various ways of storing information that are
classically thought of as “representing” numbers, and the stored information can itself be
called a “number”, but there appears to be no principled way to distinguish between valid
and invalid representations of numbers, since every “number” uncontroversially represents
itself but it is difficult to argue that it represents any other kind of number. For example,
binary numbers cannot in general be thought of as “representing” numbers stored as tally
marks, since it is easy (and in fact common practice) to store binary numbers so large that
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they cannot feasibly be implemented as tally marks. This “radically relativist” view about
numbers is known as actualism or ultrafinitism, and it is hard to argue against, though it
goes against many people’s intuitions.30 It also seems to be difficult to explain the success
of mathematical methods using ultrafinitism, though perhaps it is not impossible.
The imprecision objection. Another common objection, perhaps related to the formal-
ist/pragmatist one, is that the question “is this entry a precise description of a number?” is
not itself a precise question. This is true, but it misses the point that attempts to convince
someone that a certain description is precise are really attempts to expand their worldview
by introducing new intuitive concepts. Of course there is no precise way of characteriz-
ing when we have successfully expanded our worldview (rather than introducing erroneous
thinking), but anyone who is not a pure formalist has already expanded their worldview
by allowing at least some intuitively intelligible precise concepts, so the idea of further
expansion should not be viewed with so much suspicion.31
3. Classical vs selfmeta languages
One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of language is: what does it
mean for a statement to be true? In general the answer to this question may depend on
many things, such as the context in which the statement was made.32 Additionally, some
statements are so vague that we would be uncomfortable with saying that the question
of whether or not they are true is a precise one. However, the whole point of creating a
precise language is that it should be possible to give a precise, context-independent answer
to the question of what it would mean for any given sentence in the language to be true.
Thus, any coherent philosophy should be able to explain precisely what it would mean for
any given sentence in a language considered precise to be true.
The theory of mathematical logic contains a partial answer to this question in the case
of classical languages. Specifically, classical model theory attempts to make precise the
notion of truth with respect to a classical language by defining it recursively. For example,
a sentence of the form ‘∀x φ(x)’ (short for “for all x [in the category of objects under
consideration], φ(x) is true”) is defined to be true of a given model M if and only if for
30In particular, ultrafinitism denies the intuitively plausible claim that the validity of the standard
(feasible) algorithm for comparing the sizes of binary numbers can be thought of in terms of a second
(unfeasible) algorithm that converts both numbers to a unary representation (i.e. tally marks) and then
compares their raw sizes. Namely, it is intuitively plausible that what we mean by saying that the standard
algorithm is valid is that it gives the same answer as the second algorithm would. But ultrafinitism denies
the coherence of talking about what the second algorithm would do, once the numbers involved are large
enough.
31One can use the imprecision objection to justify not taking too seriously the question of which philo-
sophical school of thought is “correct”, on the grounds that this question is not precise, and I mostly
endorse this position.
32For a simple example, whether or not a statement of the form ‘John did X’ is true depends on which
“John” the speaker is referring to.
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every object x in M , φ(x) is true of M .33 This definition is recursive in the sense that a
concept (“truth”) is defined in terms of itself.
The question now becomes: how can a recursive definition be considered to be precise?
It certainly gives some information about the concept being defined, namely a way in which
it relates to itself, but there is conceivably some imprecision remaining, since the concept
has not been cashed out in terms of fundamental precise concepts. We can make recursive
definitions more precise by instituting the convention that they should only be considered
meaningful in cases where the meaning ultimately derives from concepts outside the recur-
sion. To formalize this convention, we introduce the notion of a “category generated by
production rules”, which is perhaps best illustrated by example. Namely, suppose we have
a two-letter alphabet E consisting of the letters ‘a’ and ‘b’. Then the notion of a string in
E can be defined by the following production rules: the letters ‘a’ and ‘b’ both constitute
strings in E, and whenever we have a string in E, then concatenating it with either ‘a’ or
‘b’ forms another string. These two rules generate the category; any object that cannot be
eventually created by these production rules is not a string in E.
The concept of production rules can be used to define the concept of a recursive definition
as follows: each case of a recursive definition corresponds to a different production rule for
the category of “facts about the recursively defined concept”. For example, the recursive
definition of truth considered above could be described in terms of production rules for the
category of true sentences and the category of false sentences: there would be a production
rule stipulating that “if the sentences φ(x) (x ∈M) are all members of the category of true
sentences, then ‘∀x φ(x)’ should be added to the category of true sentences”, and another
production rule stipulating that “if at least one of the sentences φ(x) (x ∈M) is a member
of the category of false sentences, then ‘∀x φ(x)’ should be added to the category of false
sentences”.
Does the concept of production rules need to be defined, or is it an irreducible concept?
One way we can try to define it is by using the notion of indexical recursion, where a
sequence of objects x0, x1, x2, . . . is defined by specifying how to construct each object xk
in terms of the previous objects x0, . . . , xk−1. Indexical recursion may be viewed as less
problematic than general recursion for two reasons. First, the structure of indexically
recursive definitions makes it clear that the definition is a reductive one, reducing more
complicated concepts to simpler ones as measured by the indices of the objects being
considered. Second, with indexically recursive definitions it is clear that the meaning
always ultimately derives from outside the recursion, so there is no need for a convention
handling the case where this does not happen.
We could attempt to define the notion of a category generated by production rules in
terms of indexical recursion as follows: for each number k there is the concept of the
“category generated by stage k”, denoted Ck. It is defined by indexical recursion as the
set of all things that can be created using a single instance of the production rules from
elements of Cj, j < k. We could then define the final generated category to be the union
C =
⋃
k Ck. However, this definition does not capture the intuitive notion of a category
generated by production rules (at least in the sense we mean here), because the category
33Strictly speaking, we should say that ‘∀x φ(x)’ is true of M if for every object a ∈M , φ(x) is true of
M relative to the variable assignment 〈x = a〉.
20 DAVID SIMMONS
C is not necessarily closed under the production rules, if there are “infinitary” production
rules such as the rule considered above for adding universally quantified sentences to the
collection of true sentences. Thus, it is conceivably possible to add more objects to C using
the same production rules, and what we really want to consider is the category that results
from continuing to do this indefinitely.
Thus, it is problematic to reduce the notion of a category generated by production rules
to the notion of indexical recursion. However, a more mathematically sophisticated variant
on this idea based on transfinite induction is arguably more successful (we leave the details
to the reader). Nevertheless, for the remainder of this section we will treat production rules
as an irreducible concept.
It is worth mentioning another well-known and popular attempt to reduce the concept of
production rules to other fundamental concepts: the “intersective definition” due to Frege.
They consider the scenario where the objects generated by a list of production rules R are
known in advance to lie in a given set S, and they define the set generated by the list R
to be the intersection of all subsets of S that are closed under the production rules of R.34
However, in my view this reduction is neither conceptually valid nor appropriate for the
present context, for several reasons summarized in Appendix F, and consequently I will
ignore it in the subsequent discussion.
To summarize, using the concept of recursion, possibly supplemented by the concept of
production rules, it is possible to precisely define the notion of truth with respect to a
classical language such as NT or ST, assuming that the relevant category (of numbers or
sets) is precise enough to be quantified over. This fact is surely a relief to any philosopher
who wishes to maintain that these languages are precise. But there is no need to stop there.
The argument from recursion can be modified to handle the notion of truth not only for
classical languages, but also for certain selfmeta extensions which we now define:
Definition 3.1. The Kripke extension of a classical language L, which we will denote by
K(L), is simply the language L augmented with a primitive ability to write phrases of the
form ‘φ is a true sentence of K(L)’, where φ is a term of K(L), intended to denote a string.
Let us be clear that the Kripke extension of L is very different from the metalanguage of
L. The metalanguage of L is denoted L+1 and has the primitive ability to write phrases of
the form ‘φ is a true sentence of L’, where φ is a term of L+1. However, L+1 does not have
the ability to write phrases of the form ‘φ is a true sentence of L+ 1’. The metalanguage
of L is a classical language, whereas the Kripke extension of L is a selfmeta language.
The crucial question about Kripke extensions is: Is the Kripke extension of a precise
classical language itself a precise language? Equivalently, is there a precise characterization
of what it means for any given sentence of a Kripke extension to be true?
Fortunately this question has a fairly simple answer: If the notion of truth for the original
classical language can be defined precisely in terms of production rules, then so can the
notion of truth for the Kripke extension. The reason for this is that one simply has to add
the following rules to the list of production rules:
34A set is closed under a list of production rules if it is not possible to add new members to the set by
applying the production rules.
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• “If φ is in the category of true sentences, then add ‘φ is true’ to the category of true
sentences, and add ‘φ is false’ to the category of false sentences.”
• “If φ is in the category of false sentences, then add ‘φ is false’ to the category of
true sentences, and add ‘φ is true’ to the category of false sentences.”
There is nothing unusual about these production rules, in that they have the same sort of
structure as the production rules used in the recursive definitions of truth for NT and ST,
so adding them does not appear to lead to any further philosophical problems.
Thus, it appears that if L is a classical language which can be viewed as precise according
to the standard picture of the meaning of languages provided by mathematical logic, then
the same is true for the Kripke extension K(L), which is a selfmeta language. It is natural
to ask whether the same principle works in reverse, namely whether every precise selfmeta
language has a precise classical extension.
In favor of an affirmative answer, one could argue that if L is a precise selfmeta language,
then the fact that L is precise already means that any sentence of L either has a truth-value
or does not. If so, then we could define the classicization C(L) to be NT augmented with
the ability to talk about whether sentences in L are true, false, or indeterminate. (Note
that this presupposes that NT is precise.) It would seem that C(L) would be a classical
language with at least as much expressive power as L.
To get a clear picture of the challenges this view faces, it is helpful to analyze why a
Kripke extension K(L) is not already capable of reproducing its classicization C(K(L)).
After all, the expressive power of C(K(L)) comes from the fact that it can express the
claim that a given sentence φ of K(L) is true, false, or indeterminate, and K(L) can
already express the claim that φ is true or false. So the advantage of C(K(L)) is that it
can express the claim that φ is indeterminate.
But as a matter of fact K(L) can already express this claim in a roundabout way: as ‘φ
is neither true nor false’. However, if we think of this as a sentence of K(L), then it can
never be true. According to the definition of the semantics of K(L) via production rules,
‘φ is neither true nor false’ could only be true if ‘φ is true’ and ‘φ is false’ are both false,
which in turn could only be true if φ was both false and true, which is impossible.
The paradox here is that while no sentence of K(L) can be truthfully asserted to be
indeterminate withinK(L), nevertheless there are sentences ofK(L) that are clearly neither
true nor false. The standard example is the liar’s paradoxical sentence ‘This sentence is
false’. This sentence can be translated into the language K(NT) (the Kripke extension of
classical number theory) using the standard method of quining. To be precise, there exists
a sentence φ of K(NT) which is provably equivalent to ‘φ is false’. Thus if φ is true, then
φ is false, and if φ is false, then φ is true. Since φ cannot be both true and false, it follows
that φ is neither true nor false. Moreover, it is easy to formalize this argument to show that
according to the production rules φ will never be added to the category of true sentences
nor to the category of false sentences.
The resolution of the paradox is that the phrase “not true” has a slightly different
meaning when we use it inside K(L) and when we use it outside K(L). Inside K(L),
asserting that a sentence is not true is the same as asserting that it is false, which is the
same as asserting that it is in the category of false sentences. But outside K(L), asserting
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that a sentence is not true means only that it will never be added to the category of true
sentences.
Thus, the classicization C(K(L)) has a hidden power that K(L) does not: it can make
“never” claims, rather than merely claims about what is in a given category. Now it is not
clear that the former type of claim is anywhere near as precise as the latter. For one thing,
if we view the generation of a category as an ongoing process, then claims that something
will never get added to a category are claims about the future, while claims that something
is already in a given category are claims about the present.
But the more serious objection is that it is not clear how to define the semantics for a
language in which one can make assertions of indeterminacy interpreted in a weak sense:
if we proceed in the usual way via production rules for the categories of true and false
sentences, then it is not clear what sort of production rule should lead to adding a sentence
of the form ‘φ is indeterminate’ to the category of true sentences.35
In conclusion, selfmeta languages appear to be favored over classical languages from a
philosophical point of view, in the sense that they make more natural “stopping points”
for increasing the expressive power of a language. Beyond this, it is natural to ask specifi-
cally which selfmeta languages best correspond to which philosophical positions. For this
purpose, it is necessary to consider separately the set and number realist points of view.
4. Number realism
There are many different points of view that a number realist could take, leading to many
different selfmeta languages for our Philosophical Largest Number Contest. Below, they
are listed in order of increasing expressive power. We show that each language is capable of
reproducing the classicization of the previous language, and thus the languages are ordered
in terms of increasing power. Each language has various possible axiomatizations and
various possible classical sublanguages whose definitions we leave to the reader.
4.1. Gradualist number realism. Though there are many ways to analyze the philo-
sophical divisions that exist between number realists, a natural “litmus test” is the follow-
ing Principle of Limited Omniscience, which some number realists find to be intuitively
obvious, while others deny its validity:
Principle 4.1 (Principle of Limited Omniscience). Let φ(0), φ(1), . . . be a sequence of
sentences that are precise enough to have a definite truth-value. Then the sentence Φ =
‘∀n φ(n)’ (i.e. ‘all of the sentences φ(0), φ(1), . . . are true’) is precise enough to have a
definite truth-value.
The name comes from constructivist philosophy: some philosophers known as “construc-
tivists” take the point of view that to claim that a mathematical sentence has a definite
35More precisely, it is not clear what sort of production rule should lead to adding a sentence of the form
‘φ is not true’ to the category of true sentences; the natural candidate leads to the notion of indeterminacy
being interpreted in the strong/impossible sense, not the weak sense.
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truth-value is the same as to claim the (hypothetical) ability to discover what the truth-
value is.36 On this view, a mathematician who uses the Principle of Limited Omniscience
to conclude that the Goldbach conjecture (the claim that every even number ≥ 4 can be
written as the sum of two primes) is either true or false is claiming the ability to figure out
(given enough time and effort, but with a precise plan from the start) whether the Gold-
bach conjecture is true or false. However, no algorithm is known to be able to succeed at
this task. Thus, the mathematician appears to be claiming a kind of limited omniscience,
hence the name.
An obvious criticism of this view is that in ordinary reasoning, when one claims that a
sentence has a definite truth-value, one is not ordinarily claiming to know what the truth-
value is, even in a speculative way. For example, after flipping a coin and not looking at
the outcome, one may reasonably assert that the claim that the coin has landed on heads
has a definite truth-value, even though one may not know which it is. It is not clear why
mathematical reasoning should be any different.
Nevertheless, there are still good reasons why someone might not accept the Principle
of Limited Omniscience. One reason is the principle that a claim cannot be true unless
there is/are some thing/things that makes/make it true. The obvious answer to the ques-
tion of what kind of things could make the claim Φ true is that the truths of the claims
φ(0), φ(1), . . . could make Φ true. But it is not clear that it makes sense to talk about
infinitely many things at the same time, and if it is impossible to do so, then the previous
sentence does not make sense and thus Φ cannot be made true in this way. (There may be
other ways to make Φ true, such as the existence of valid reasoning of one sort or another
demonstrating that φ(n) is true where n is a free variable used in the reasoning, but it is
not at all clear that these other ways will be enough to make up for the loss of power from
the “main” or “canonical” way of making Φ true. See Appendix D for further discussion.)
There are a couple of different ways to phrase the same point. Recall that in the previous
section, I argued that future-tense claims about ongoing processes are inherently less precise
than present-tense claims. Now if we view the assignment of truth-values to the claims
φ(0), φ(1), . . . as an ongoing process, such that at any given point in time only finitely
many of the claims have been assigned truth-values, then the claim that all of the sentences
φ(0), φ(1), . . . will eventually be labelled as true is a future-tense claim, and thus we can
coherently reject it on the grounds of imprecision.
Alternatively, if we take the point of view that what really matters is our ability to
write an algorithm computing the truth-value of any sentence, then we can reject universal
quantification on the grounds that our algorithm could never safely return ‘true’ as the
truth-value for a universally quantified claim, since at any point in time the algorithm will
only have computed finitely many of the truth-values of the sentences φ(0), φ(1), . . .. Again,
this defect could be partially fixed if we allowed the algorithm to return ‘true’ if there is
a proof that a universally quantified sentence is true, but this solution is inelegant and in
any case many true sentences cannot be proven.
36Some constructivists may instead take the weaker point of view that mathematics is best purified
by labelling claims of the form ‘X has a definite truth-value, but I don’t know how to find it’ as “non-
mathematical”.
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These arguments point not only towards rejecting the Principle of Limited Omniscience,
but towards rejecting unbounded universal quantification over the category of numbers
as a precise concept. I call gradualist number realism the view that unbounded universal
quantification should be rejected for these reasons, but bounded universal and unbounded
existential quantification should be allowed. The corresponding mathematical theory will
be called gradualist number theory and denoted GNT.37 The term “gradualist” refers to
the fact that a gradualist number realist may hold that the creation of the category of
numbers is an ongoing process.
4.2. Logicist number realism. If a number realist accepts the Principle of Limited Om-
niscience, as well as the concept of recursion via production rules described in the previous
section, then he must also accept the language K(NT), the Kripke extension of classical
number theory. One option is to go no farther, and we call this view logicist number realism.
4.3. The language of generated categories. One reason to go beyond K(NT) is based
on analyzing the intuitions behind the Principle of Limited Omniscience. The fundamen-
tal idea is that it works because the category of numbers is “well-defined”: it includes
everything that you get if you start with 0 and repeatedly apply the successor operation.
But this intuition can be extended to other categories with precisely defined generating
processes, leading to the following generalization of the Principle of Limited Omniscience:
Principle 4.2 (Principle of Precise Categories). Let C be a category generated by pro-
duction rules, and suppose that we have a method for associating to each member x of C
a sentence φ(x) which is precise enough that it is either true or false. Then the sentence
Φ = ‘∀x ∈ C φ(x)’ (“for all x in C, φ(x) is true”) is either true or false.
Given Principle 4.2, it follows from a trivial argument38 that every sentence of K(NT)
is either true or not. Thus the classicization C(K(NT)) is also a precise language, and
in particular Principle 4.2 implies that K(NT) is not maximal. This raises the question:
What kind of language is best capable of formalizing the reasoning of a philosopher who
accepts Principle 4.2?
Well, it is clear that if we accept Principle 4.2, then the notion of a category generated
by production rules becomes crucially important. Thus, it becomes useful to develop a
convention for describing such categories. For simplicity we consider the case where the
categories to be described are subsets of the natural numbers, such as the set of all true
sentences of K(NT) or similarly constructed categoies. Our convention in this case is as
follows: if Φ(n, C) is a formula with one first-order free variable ‘n’ and one second-order
free variable ‘C’ that only appears positively (i.e. ‘m ∈ C’ can appear but not ‘m /∈ C’),
then the category CΦ is generated according to the family of production rules: “If Φ(n, CΦ)
is true, then add n to C”. For example, if CΦ is the category of true statements of NT
37Gradualist number theory may be compared with Heyting arithmetic, a theory which allows unbounded
universal quantification but requires its axiomatizations to use it in a more restricted way. To me the
fundamental problem with Heyting arithmetic is that its semantics are fundamentally unclear due to the
way that implication is treated; see Appendix D for a more sensible treatment of the notion of implication.
38If φ is a sentence of K(NT), then for every ψ in the category of true sentences of K(NT), either
φ = ψ or φ 6= ψ. Thus by Principle 4.2, either φ = ψ for some such ψ, or φ 6= ψ for all such ψ. But in the
first case φ is true, while in the second case φ is not true.
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then Φ(n, C) would be a disjunct of several statements including “n = ‘∀m φ(m)RQ and
∀m ‘φ(m)’ ∈ C”.
Using this convention, we define the language of generated categories GC, which is NT
augmented with the ability to refer to categories of the form CΦ, where Φ(n, C) is a formula
in GC. We need to allow Φ to range over GC, and not just NT, in order to make GC a
selfmeta language (we leave the proof that it is selfmeta as an exercise39). However, it has
the effect that not all categories CΦ that can be written in GC are well-defined. If Φ refers
to NT, then CΦ is well-defined, and if Φ refers only to categories CΨ such that CΨ is well-
defined, then CΦ is well-defined. However, there is no way of knowing in advance whether
this is the case or not. The strength of an axiomatization of GC could be measured by
how many categories CΦ it can prove are well-defined.
Example 4.3. The set of true statements in K(NT) is a generated category in the sense
described here (we leave the details as an exercise to the reader).
Example 4.4. The set of objects in the minimal model of Kripke–Platek set theory, to-
gether with true non-quantified statements about this minimal model, is a generated cate-
gory.
Example 4.5. The set of computable ordinals is a generated category. It follows that
the expression f(n) = BBα(n)(n) defined by Scott Aaronson in his MathOverflow post
“Succinctly naming big numbers: ZFC versus Busy-Beaver”40 is definable in GC. It also
follows that the Feferman–Schutte ordinal Γ0 can be expressed in GC, meaning that GC
is to be considered “impredicative”.41
4.4. Transfinite time and constructive set theory. Having reduced the concept of
recursion to the concept of production rules, we can ask whether we can reduce the concept
of production rules to something more fundamental. The answer becomes clearer if we ask:
in what order do objects get added to a generated category? One could answer that this
question is nonsensical, in which case the language of generated categories would be the
most fundamental language. However, if we think that the question is meaningful, then we
are led to a notion of time more general than finite time, i.e. infinite or ordinal time. This
is because for an infinitary production rule like “if φ(n) is true for every n, then ∀n φ(n)
is true”, if each φ(n) is added to the category of true statements at a different point in
time, then ∀n φ(n) can only be added after an infinite amount of time has passed. Ordinal
arithmetic gives a way of quantifying infinite amounts of time.
So, adding objects to categories according to production rules is a computation that takes
place over ordinal time. It is then perhaps natural to allow set theory based on transfinite
time, as long as it does not break the descriptionalist principle that every mathematical
39The basic idea is to recursively define a map φ(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ CΦ from formulas with an arbitrary
number of free variables into categories, such that φ(a1, . . . , an) is true if and only if 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ CΦ,
where 〈·〉 is the standard n-tupling function on N.
40https://mathoverflow.net/questions/34710/succinctly-naming-big-numbers-zfc-versus-busy-beaver?rq=1
41The ordinal Γ0 is supposed to be the exact limit of predicative reasoning, which means that predicative
reasoning will be best described by a classical language, whose largest number contest therefore has a brute
force strategy. Similar remarks apply to this case as to the case of classical set theory discussed in the next
section.
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object should be describable in principle. We define the universe of constructible sets L as
follows:
Definition 4.6.
• At the start of time L is the empty set .
• At any given ordinal time α, we denote the current value of L by Lα. The successor
Lα+1 is defined as
Lα+1 = Lα ∪ {{x ∈ Lα : φα(x)} : φ ∈ ST},
where φα(x) denotes φ(x) with its predicates restricted to Lα (so e.g. if φ(x) is
“∀y y ∈ x”, then φα(x) would be “∀y ∈ Lα y ∈ x”).
• The universe continues expanding without limit as long as the principle that every
object must be describable can be adhered to.
Note that each set {x ∈ Lα : φα(x)} can be described perfectly in terms of the formula
φ and the ordinal α. Thus, the universe will continue to expand for as long as it is possible
to precisely describe ordinals.
It does not make sense to universally quantify over the entire universe of constructible
sets, because the amount to which it can expand is defined vaguely. However, it makes sense
to existentially quantify over it, since asserting the existence of an ordinal is the same as
claiming to have a way of identifying the ordinal. Thus, we define the language of gradualist
descriptivist set theory GDST in an analogous manner to gradualist number theory GNT
(see Appendix A for details), but quantifying over sets rather than over numbers.
The strength of the language GDST depends on exactly how it is interpreted: which
ordinals are describable? One answer is “the ordinals that can be proven to exist in Kripke–
Platek set theory”, and then GDST is weaker than the language of generated categories
GC.
However, with a more powerful axiom system, one can prove that GDST is capable of
reproducing the classicization of the language of generated categories C(GC). For example,
the axiom “there is an ordinal that cannot be referred to by a term of GDST” is sufficiently
strong.42
5. Set realism
The “official” philosophy of the mathematical community, to the extent that there is one,
is set realism, the view that it is possible to talk precisely about “sets”, where the word
‘set’ is understood in at least one of its two classical senses. This philosophy is enshrined
in the convention that a properly “mathematical” proof is one that can be formalized in
the axiom system ZFC (Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with Choice), which is the standard
axiomatization of the language of classical set theory ST. However, most mathematicians
are not very aware of the philosophical arguments for and against set realism, and perhaps
42Indeed, if f is any term in GDST that refers to a method of associating to an ordinal a subset of N,
then for each n we can consider the term ‘fst{α : n ∈ f(α+1)}’: by hypothesis, the ordinal β coming from
our axiom is not equal to this ordinal for any n. It follows that for all n, either n /∈ f(α+ 1) or n ∈ f(β)
for some β ≤ α. So if f is monotone increasing, then f(α) = f(α+1). This implies that GDST is capable
of reproducing C(GC).
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the primary reason for the widespread use of ZFC is simply the largeness of its class of
syntactically provable sentences – many mathematicians are pragmatists or formalists, and
if we are not interested in philosophical truth and we are just manipulating symbols, then
we might as well allow the broadest possible rules for symbol manipulation, as long as the
system doesn’t become uninteresting due to the discovery of an inconsistency.
There are two different classical ways of interpreting the word ‘set’, corresponding two
different types of set realism:
The naive view. One point of view is that the intuitive notion of a “set” or “collection”
is already precise enough that the phrase ‘the category of all sets whose members are sets,
members of members are sets, and so on’ uniquely identifies a category of objects, the
“universe of (hereditary) sets”. According to this view, sentences in ST are thought of as
talking about and quantifying over the members of this category.
A key point brought up in favor of this view is the fact that we ordinarily consider two
different lists of objects to be equivalent if they agree on the question of which objects are
members of the list. For example, the list ‘Alice and Bob’ is considered to be equivalent
to the list ‘Bob and Alice’ even though the word order is different. It is then claimed that
this is evidence that we believe that there is a pre-existing object (a “collection”) that the
lists ‘Alice and Bob’ and ‘Bob and Alice’ both identify.
A criticism of this view is that the fact that two terms are considered equivalent does
not necessarily imply that there is some pre-existing object that we are thinking of them as
identifying. In fact, the fact that we think of their equivalence in terms of the members of
the lists rather than in terms of the two lists’ identifying a single common object suggests
that perhaps there is not such an object.
Another criticism of the naive view is the well-known Russell’s paradox. Although it is
usually conceived of as a mathematical argument yielding a contradiction in a certain axiom
system (known as naive set theory), its relevance to philosophy is that there is no obvious
reason why ‘the set of all sets that do not contain themselves’ is not a valid description
of a set under the intuitive notion of a set. Thus the paradox appears to show that the
intuitive notion of a set as a pre-existing object (assuming that there is such an intuitive
notion) is inconsistent, and in particular is not a precise notion.
Two ways a set realist can respond to this are (a) to claim that their intuition does not
suggest that there is a set of all sets that do not contain themselves or (b) to suggest that
there should be a “limiting principle” used in conjunction with intuition, for example John
von Neumann’s criterion that “A [class] is too large [to be a set] [if and only if] it can be
put in one-to-one correspondence with the [class] of all sets” [4, footnote 6]. It seems that
there is not much to say about (a); regarding (b), it seems problematic that this “limiting
principle” was not suggested by intuition but merely by the discovery of paradoxes. In fact,
the idea that infinite sets and “classes” have “sizes” that can be compared by checking for
the existence of one-to-one correspondences is itself a modern idea that appears to have
only a meager basis in intuition.
Another objection is that the distinction between sets and “classes” is conceptually
incoherent since “classes” seem to have all of the properties we would intuitively expect
sets to have. One response to this is that the notion of a “class” corresponds to the notion
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of a logical set rather than the notion of a classical set; that is, it is simply a description
of a criterion for distinguishing between sets abstracted away from the details of that
description. Another possible response is to deny that the notion of “classes” is legitimate
and to use other heuristics for thinking about the “size” of sets rather than von Neumann’s.
A final objection is that in order to precisely talk about a category of sets, it is first
necessary to precisely define what sorts of objects can be members of those sets. The clas-
sical way of answering this is to restrict attention to the class of hereditary sets, i.e. sets
whose members are sets, whose members are sets, all the way down. However, one might
respond that this leads to circularity: the concept of a hereditary set is only well-defined
to the extent that the category of possible members of a hereditary set, i.e. the category
of hereditary sets, is well-defined.
The iterative picture. In part due to the difficulties outlined above, many set realists
today prefer a different conception of the universe of sets, which can be described as follows:
Intuitive Picture 5.1 (Iterative universe of sets, classical conception).
1. The construction of the universe of sets occurs in “stages”. At each stage, there is
a well-defined collection of sets that exist at that stage, and each set that exists at
a stage also exists at all later stages. The collection of all sets that exist at stage α
is usually denoted Vα.
2. In the first (or 0th) stage, no sets exist, i.e. V0 is defined to be the empty collection.
3. After we have reached stage α and consequently defined a collection Vα, when
passing to the next stage α + 1 we add to Vα all subsets of Vα, i.e. Vα+1 is defined
to be the collection of all subsets of Vα.
4. The process is endless in a strong way: after infinitely many stages have passed,
there is another stage after that, and so on: no phenomenon (such as “infinitely
many stages having passed”) is enough to make the process stop. (A process which
continues after infinitely many stages have passed is called a transfinite process.)
The collection of all sets that exist at a “limit stage” α is simply the union of the
collection of sets that have existed before that stage, i.e. Vα is defined to be the
collection of sets that are in some collection of the form Vβ, where β is a stage
preceding α.
This picture depends on two key concepts: the notion of a “subset” and the notion of
an “endless transfinite process”. It may be compared with the picture of the constructible
universe given in §4.4, in which each of these concepts is modified somewhat (specifically,
“subset” becomes “logical subset” and “endless transfinite process” becomes “transfinite
process that goes on as long as it can remain descriptionalist”).
The notion of a “subset” appears to be at least somewhat more coherent than the naive
notion of a “set”. In particular, it is exempt from criticism based on Russell’s paradox, on
the incoherence of the distinction between sets and classes, or on the necessity to precisely
define a category of objects before one can precisely talk about sets that contain objects
from this category. However, one may still object that the intuitive notion of a set or
subset is usually formed by example from things like lists of objects or descriptions of
categories of objects, but according to standard set realism neither of those things forms
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a prototypical example of a set.43 To put it another way, one might define a subset of a
category to be a way of choosing some members of the category for inclusion and others
for exclusion, but it is not clear that we can talk about “choosing” independent of our
methods for making choices, and our methods for making precise choices generally involve
descriptions or algorithms of some sort.
Regarding the notion of an “endless transfinite process”, the obvious criticism is that
the intuitive notion of a “process” clearly excludes the idea that there could be a new
stage after infinitely many stages have passed, so that the notion of a “transfinite process”
already does not make sense. After all, there is no point in time when infinitely many stages
will have passed; infinity is only an abstraction. The main responses to this criticism seem
to be: firstly, that dealing with transfinite processes becomes intuitive after you deal with
them for a while; and secondly, that many parts of the theory of transfinite processes can
be encoded in mathematics which is less controversial (see in particular §4.4 above). Note
that it is possible to accept the notion of a transfinite process while rejecting the notion of
an abstract subset, see §4.4.
In addition, in this paper I will present a further criticism of the idea of an endless
process: not that such a process is nonsensical, but that universal quantification over the
outputs of such a process is imprecise or nonsensical. The reason for this is that at any given
point in time, the process is only partially complete and so it makes no sense to quantify
over all objects that the process will eventually produce, only the ones that it has already
produced. It is possible for a set realist to accept this criticism while remaning a set realist,
leading to a view I will call gradualist set realism. However, accepting the criticism leads to
the conclusion that the language of classical set theory ST (with unbounded quantifiers)
does not have precise semantics.
Finally, let us briefly mention one argument used in favor of set realism which does not
itself specify a semantics to be used in the interpretation of ST: the indispensability ar-
gument which alleges that since modern mathematics is indispensable for modern science,
which can be empirically verified, modern mathematics and in particular set theory has
been empirically verified. However, there is little reason to think that this is anything more
than a historical accident. Namely, the fact that mathematicians make sure that their
arguments can be formalized in ZFC is not necessarily the basis of the conceptual validity
of their arguments, which are ordinarily conceived through intuitive reasoning. Verifying
that arguments can be formalized in ZFC, though useful, may be nothing more than a
double-check. In particular, there seems to be a consensus among mathematical logicians
that a great deal of mathematical reasoning can be formalized in languages and axiom sys-
tems much weaker than ST and ZFC. For example, Harvey Friedman’s “grand conjecture”
claims that “Every theorem published in the Annals of Mathematics [that can be translated
into NT] can be proved in EFA”.44 Here EFA denotes “Elementary Function Arithmetic”,
an axiomatization of NT that is much weaker than the standard axiomatization PA. Sim-
larly, Solomon Feferman has claimed that “surprisingly meager (in the proof-theoretical
43For example, a set realist would normally hold that only “countably many” sets can be described.
44http://cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/1999-April/003014.html. In support of his conjecture, Fried-
man claims that “in every case where a logician has taken the time to learn the proofs, that logician also
[has seen] how to prove the theorem in Peano Arithmetic.”
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sense) predicatively justified systems suffice for the direct formalization of almost all, if not
all, scientifically applicable mathematics” [1, p.443], and Geoffrey Hellman has said that
“whether, indeed, there are any serious limitations to predicativist mathematics’ power
to recover scientifically applicable mathematics remains an important open question” [3,
p.462]. Here, predicativism is a type of number realism that allows for fairly powerful lan-
guages and axiom systems.
Strongest axiom contest for the language of set theory ST. The obvious starting point
for the strongest axiom contest for ST is its standard axiomatization ZFC. For an example
of a philosophical defense of ZFC from a set realist perspective, see [4]. Essentially, ZFC
formalizes many common intuitions about the “universe of sets”, as described either by the
naive view or in the iterative picture. However, ZFC does not capture all possible intuitions
about set theory, and there is no particular reason for set realists to limit themselves to ZFC
rather than trying to axiomatize other intuitions. In particular, in the iterative picture the
phrase ‘all subsets’ in (3), and the phrase ‘no phenomenon is enough to make the process
stop’ in (4), can always generate more intuitions, which we can then attempt to formalize.
A straightforward example is the axiom of inaccessible cardinals. Roughly speaking, this
axiom says that there is some stage α we can stop at such that the resulting universe Vα
is closed under the rules for producing sets described by the axiom system ZFC.45 This
axiom can be thought of as a formalization of the principle that “no phenomenon is enough
to make the process stop”, since it hypothesizes that the phenomenon of having used all of
the production rules of ZFC as much as we possibly can is not enough to make the process
stop.
Though there are more large cardinal axioms for which it is possible to give a strong
intuitive argument or “intrinsic justification” using set realism as a starting assumption,46
eventually we get to axioms which philosophers have attempted to give “extrinsic justifi-
cations” based on data other than intuition.47 For example, when attempting to justify an
axiom philosophers may cite as evidence “confirmation by instances, prediction, provid-
ing new proofs of old theorems, unifying new results with old, extending patterns begun
in weaker theories, providing powerful new ways of solving old problems, filling a gap in
a previously conjectured ‘false, but natural’ proof, explanatory power, and intertheoretic
45The phrase ‘rules for producing sets described by the axiom system ZFC’ is not taken literally, since
the axiom schemas of ZFC (separation and replacement) can only be instantiated for definable classes,
and the production rules used to define inaccessible cardinals are taken to apply to all classes (i.e. subsets
of Vα), regardless of whether or not they are definable.
46Opinion varies on exactly which axioms can count as “intrinsically justified”. Some say that axioms
as strong as the axiom of remarkable cardinals are justified by intuition [6, Theorem 3.3], while I do not
really see how even the axiom of Mahlo cardinals can be made plausible by appealing to intuition (the
argument given in [6] is not very convincing since the number of possible values of a second-order variable
in Vκ increases dramatically as κ increases, so there is no clear reason why we would expect anything to
stabilize over all possible values of such a variable).
47Though popular, the labels ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ seem wrong to me. Namely, human intuition is
not something that is intrinsic to any language; it is conceptually independent. In other words, to define
a language, it is not necessary to define all possible intuitions that one may have about the language.
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connections” [5, §VII].48 While such considerations are certainly relevant in any discussion
of the epistemology of mathematics, there does seem to be a relatively clear conceptual
distinction between intuitively plausible axioms and hypotheses made plausible in other
ways, though in any given case it may be unclear where the line lies. Note that large cardi-
nal axioms whose standard justifications are “extrinsic” tend to be far more powerful than
those whose standard justifications are intuitive. It appears to be an interesting question
whether the same will hold for number realist languages.
Large cardinal axioms, i.e. axioms that hypothesize the existence of stages in the iterative
picture with certain properties, are conventionally ordered according to their consistency
strength. An axiom system A is said to be consistent if no claim of the form P ∧ ¬P (i.e.
“the claim P is both true and false”, a contradiction) is syntactically provable in A. The
notion of consistency is particularly important in mathematics because it can be formalized
in fairly weak languages such as NT.49 Since no sentence can be both true and false, every
valid axiom system is consistent, but the converse is not true. The axiom system A1 is
said to have greater 50 consistency strength than the axiom system A2 if the consistency
of A2 can be proven in some “neutral” axiom system (known as the metatheory) using
the hypothesis that A1 is consistent. The selection of a metatheory is important because
otherwise all consistent axiom systems would be equally consistent.51 There is nothing to
rule out choosing one of the systems A1 or A2 as the metatheory, but usually a “weaker”
axiom system such as PA or even PRA (Primitive Recursive Arithmetic) is chosen. Note
that the ordering of axiom systems by consistency strength is essentially the reverse of the
ordering by plausibility: an axiom system A1 with greater consistency strength tends to
be less plausible than an axiom system A2 with lesser consistency strength, since if both
A1 and the “neutral” axiom system are valid, then A2 is consistent and therefore plausibly
valid; so the plausibility of A1 feeds into the plausibility of A2 but not vice-versa.
However, the ordering of axiom systems by consistency strength is not the appropriate
one to make comparisons between their corresponding axiomatic strategies in the Busy
48It is interesting to note that almost all of the items on this list are the kind of evidence used by abductive
reasoning, or reasoning from consequences. If we view intuitive arguments as deductive reasoning, then it
appears that what is missing is inductive reasoning, or reasoning based on expectations. While inductive
reasoning is often used in mathematics in the form of probabilistic heuristic arguments (such as the standard
argument justifying the conjecture that
√
2 has equal proportions of all digits in its decimal expansion),
it is interesting to ask whether there are any large cardinal axioms that can be made more plausible by
inductive reasoning.
49From listening to some mathematicians, one could get the impression that this formalizability property
means that syntactic consistency is a more primitive notion than truth. One of the goals of this paper
is to argue the opposite: that languages and their semantics are more conceptually primitive than axiom
systems and their corresponding notions of syntactic provability.
50In mathematics the word ‘greater’ is often used in an inclusive sense, i.e. as shorthand for ‘greater or
equal’.
51Axiom systems could still be ranked according to how plausible the philosophical arguments for their
consistency are, but the idea of such a ranking has a decidedly non-mathematical flavor. Reference to a
metatheory is also important because of my view that sentences of the form ‘if P , then Q’ can only be
thought of as claims or sentences (rather than merely intelligible utterances) to the extent that modes of
reasoning with respect to which it is being claimed that Q can be inferred from P can be understood from
context. This view will be explained further in Appendix D.
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Beaver contest and the largest number contests of selfmeta languages, according to Corol-
laries 1.6 and 2.5. In fact, no axiomatization of ST is stronger than any other according
to the criterion specified there, since the language ST is incapable of reproducing its own
metalanguage, and thus if A1 and A2 are axiomatizations of ST, it is not even possible
to ask the question of whether A1 is stronger than the metasystem A2 + 1, since these
axiom systems are not formulated in the same language. This is a hint that the classical
language ST is not a good language for metamathematics for any form of set realism, a
point which I will argue further below. For now, let us note that a partial response based
on classical mathematics is that a slightly stronger notion than consistency suffices to com-
pare axiom systems well enough to determine which axiomatic strategies will do better at
the Busy Beaver contest, namely the notion of ω-consistency. The notion of ω-consistency
depends on the notion of an ω-syntactic proof, which is essentially a syntactic proof in
which “infinite but countable” chains of reasoning are allowed. An axiom system is said to
be ω-consistent if no contradiction is ω-syntactically provable. We have the following:
Theorem 5.2. Let A1 and A2 be two ω-consistent axiomatizations of ST, and suppose
that A1 can prove that A2 is ω-consistent. Then the axiomatic strategy of A1 in the Busy
Beaver contest wins against the axiomatic strategy of A2.
In my opinion, this theorem is not very natural because the notion of ω-consistency is
not conceptually simple (in comparison to the notion of a language that has the ability to
talk about another language’s semantics), and because it only applies to the Busy Beaver
contest and not to the largest number contests of selfmeta languages, for which other con-
cepts would be needed. However, it does allow the comparison of the axiomatic strategies
of various large cardinal axioms. I leave as an exercise to mathematical logicians the ques-
tion of whether the standard ordering of large cardinal axioms according to consistency
strength is the same as the ordering according to the strength of their axiomatic strategies
in the Busy Beaver contest as well as in other contests possessing axiomatic strategies.
Largest number contest run by set realists. Even if we are satisfied with the view that
in the end, ω-consistency or some other constructed criterion is to be used for judging the
strength of axiom systems rather than their raw ability to formalize reasoning about each
other, when we consider the largest number contest rather than the largest axiom contest,
things get more difficult for a semi-naive version of set realism. This is because the most
obvious way for a semi-naive set realist to make precise his largest number contest is to
reduce it to the largest number contest of the language ST. But this contest has a brute
force strategy! To highlight the absurdity, we ask the set realist if he is really going to reject
the entry ‘the number referred to by the term φST{10100}, where φST is as in Theorem 1.2’
to their contest on the grounds that it is not technically a term of ST. This is true, but
surely the entry is almost as good as a term of ST, since it can be converted into one given
enough time and computational power. Moreover, ordinary mathematical discourse is not
directly framed in ST, but the idea is that there is some method, often partly algorithmic,
via which this discourse can be translated into ST. So the idea that an algorithm that can
generate a term of ST is almost as good as a term of ST seems to be embedded in the
very idea of interpreting standard mathematical reasoning as reasoning in ST.
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Once the set realist admits that the informal description ‘my entry is the term φST{10100}’
is a valid entry, things really start to get interesting. If he allows the use of an algorithm for
generating terms of ST, then he has to address the question of what kind of algorithms are
allowed. He could of course require the algorithms to belong to a small class like the class
of primitive recursive algorithms, but this would be somewhat arbitrary and would also
yield a degenerate largest number contest. Similar remarks apply to the class of algorithms
that can be proven to terminate in some fixed axiom system like ZFC. A better option is
to require only a semantic proof that the algorithm described in an entry halts, such as
a philosophical argument for some large cardinal axiom together with the stipulation that
the axiomatic strategy for the Busy Beaver contest should be used. This would at least
gets him away from the realm of degenerate largest number contests and into the realm
where axiomatic strategies are appropriate.
However, stopping at algorithms seems to indicate that the key thing about them is
the fact that they can be used to compute strings in ST, rather than just the fact that
they uniquely identify strings in ST. Such an emphasis seems a little inappropriate for set
realists, who are usually uninterested in whether objects can be computed as long as they
can be proven to exist. Thus, it seems likely that many set realists will take the point of
view that any description that uniquely identifies a string in ST is almost as good as the
string it identifies, and that talking about “the number named by the ST-term named by
the ST-term t” (where t is a concrete ST-term) is just as precise as talking about “the
number named by the ST-term t”.
These considerations suggest that a set realist who accepts ST should also accept its
metalanguage ST + 1, which is capable of transcribing the above terms. Applying the
same argument, the set realist should also accept ST + 2, and so on, all the way up to
the Kripke extension K(ST). This reinforces our earlier conclusion in Section 3 that any
philosopher who accepts the language ST should also accept the language K(ST).
However, a set realist need not accept ST as a precise language at all. He may instead
say that this analysis shows that the idea of allowing arbitrary quantification over the
outputs of a so-called “endless” process is incoherent. In other words, whenever we start
to talk about the objects that have been created by the process up to some point, then our
ability to meaningfully talk about these objects depends on the existence of larger objects
delineating truths from falsehoods, meaning that the process continues past the collection
of objects that we are currently talking about. In this view, which we will call gradualist
set realism, it is incoherent to claim that “for all sets x and y, there is a set {x, y}”, since
the truth of such a sentence would depend on facts about all sets, and at no time do all
sets exist, so at no time can something be true about all of them. Instead, the Axiom of
Pair should be thought of merely as a description of a process for creating sets from other
sets, but not as a claim that would have been precise if we didn’t already know that the
process exists.
It turns out to be possible use the principles of gradualist set realism to define a language
similar to ST, which we will denote by GST (for gradualist set theory), which does not
allow unbounded universal quantification; see Appendix A for details. Bounded universal
quantification is allowed, because the quantification ranges over the members of a set
which already exists, so that it makes sense to talk about all of the members of the set
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simultaneously. The language GST has the property that it is selfmeta, meaning that it
is capable of reproducing its own metalanguage. Note that classical languages cannot be
selfmeta due to Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth; the key here is that the
language is not fundamentally based on the classical (unbounded) predicate calculus.
Although the language GST initially appears to be incapable of formalizing classical
mathematics (which uses reasoning that is supposed to be formalizable in ZFC), it can
in fact reproduce a language with respect to which ZFC is usually presumed to be valid:
the language with the syntax of ST whose semantics is given by interpreting the word
‘set’ to range over all members of Vκ, where κ is a concretely specified inaccessible cardinal
(for example, the first inaccessible cardinal). we will denote this language by STκ.
52 Note
that GST must have primitive language for talking about large cardinals with a specified
property, such as the first inaccessible cardinal, in order for this to work.
Since GST is selfmeta, there are no obvious philosophical arguments showing that some-
one who accepts that GST has precise semantics should also accept that some stronger
language has precise semantics. Namely, the argument that anyone who accepts a language
should also accept its metalanguage is irrelevant, because someone who accepts GST has
already accepted the metalanguage of GST, since it is reproducible in GST. Thus, GST
can be viewed as an “ultimate ontology”, and can thereby used to convert the imprecise
“philosophical largest number contest” into a precise largest number contest, namely the
largest number contest of GST (cf. Contest definitionPT 1.1).
The obvious strategy for this largest number contest is the linguistic strategy mentioned
just before Theorem 2.3: first describe a large cardinal κ using GST, and then use the
brute force strategy on STκ. In order for this to work we need to make sure that our
description of κ in GST is in fact a valid description, and for this purpose we need to make
some kind of argument. Arguments tend to be best made in some axiom system, which we
can expect to be an axiomatization of GST.
Theorem 2.4 shows that the Philosophical Largest Number Contest for gradualist set
realists reduces to the Philosophical Strongest Axiom Contest. At this point it will be
useful to revisit our analysis of the strongest axiom contest for set realists, this time under
the gradualist assumption. SinceGST is selfmeta, it is legitimate to compare large cardinal
axioms on the basis of whether one axiom system is more powerful than the metasystem
of another axiom system. However, there is the issue that not all large cardinal axioms
can be translated into GST, since some are stated using unbounded quantifiers. Though
more powerful large cardinal axioms tend to be more likely to use unbounded quantifiers,
this relationship is not straightforward and the strongest large cardinal axiom not currently
known to be inconsistent with ZFC, i.e. the rank-into-rank Axiom I0, is formulated using
only bounded quantifiers.
If φ is a large cardinal axiom formulated using unbounded quantifiers, then it is still
possible to translate into GST the claim that φ is true in some universe: namely, this
claim can be translated as ‘∃κ inaccessible such that φκ holds’, where φκ denotes the result
of replacing all quantifiers in φ by quantifiers over the universe Vκ. We will call this claim
52Note that gradualist set realism appears to be incompatible with classical set realism, since the lan-
guages STκ all have different semantics and so it appears that the language ST does not have any canonical
semantics.
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the “existence of a universe satisfying φ”. Thus, in addition to comparing the strength of
various large cardinal axioms with bounded quantifiers, one may also compare the strength
of the assumption that there exists a universe satisfying a given large cardinal axiom with
unbounded quantifiers. Note that if φ is an axiom formulated inGST, then the existence of
a universe satisfying φ is a stronger claim than φ; in fact, it is stronger than the metasystem
of φ, since GST can talk about the notion of truth within any fixed universe. So to show
that an axiom system A1 is stronger than the metasystem of another axiom system A2, it
suffices to show that A1 can prove the existence of a universe satisfying A2.
Again, we leave the details of exactly which large cardinal axioms are the strongest
according to this criterion as an exercise for the interested mathematician. (We expect
that the axiom systems we give below for dealing with truth should suffice to answer this
question, so the question can be attacked from a purely formalist perspective.)
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Appendix A. Proposition/term languages
In the appendices, we will assume that the reader is somewhat familiar with the tech-
niques and terminology of mathematical logic, and is capable of filling in missing details
of arguments and definitions when they are routine or obvious.53 However, the languages
we consider in this paper differ in several respects from the languages which are familiar to
most mathematical logicians, namely those expressed in the standard (first-order, classical)
predicate calculus. We summarize the main differences as follows:
• We use Kleene’s (weak) “three-valued” logic rather than the classical two-valued
logic: a formula may be either true, or false, or it may be indeterminate i.e. neither
true nor false. There are three different ways for a formula to be indeterminate,
which will be described in more detail below. We will think of the truth-value of
a formula as a “dynamic” quantity: an indeterminate formula may at any time
become true or false, but a true or false formula can never become indeterminate
or otherwise change its truth-value. Due to our use of three-valued logic, the axiom
systems we consider will not contain the law of excluded middle, but they will
contain suitable replacements. Note that despite the word “three-valued”, in this
system formulas have only two possible truth-values (‘true’ and ‘false’); the “third
value” is the label ‘indeterminate’ which is applied to formulas that do not have
truth-values, but it is not itself a truth-value. Moreover, there is no “axiom of
assignment” asserting that every formula either has one of the truth-values or is
indeterminate, although evidently no formula can fail to take either truth-value
while also failing to be indeterminate (since by definition any formula that fails to
take either truth-value is indeterminate).
• Due to the need for languages with terms referring to very large numbers, we con-
sider languages with term templates more general than those allowed by the stan-
dard predicate calculus. For example, the language of number theory will have a
rule for constructing terms of the form
(A.1) max{t(m) : m ≤ n, φ(m)}
where t(m) is a term withm as a free variable and φ(m) is a formula withm as a free
variable. (Such a term would not be allowed in the standard predicate calculus, in
which only quantifiers can bind variables, not term operators, and in which formulas
can contain terms but not vice-versa.) The class of term templates we consider
is motivated by mathematical practice and by the principle that increasing the
expressive power of terms should not increase the expressive power of the language
as a whole.
53As a convenience we recall the technical distinction between terms and formulas, which is most easily
described in terms of their semantics: once a variable assignment has been fixed, then terms are supposed
to have referents (which are mathematical objects), and formulas are supposed to have truth-values (which
are either ‘true’ or ‘false’), although not all terms have referents and not all formulas have truth-values.
Note that in the case of terms and formulas with no free variables, it is not necessary to fix a variable
assignment before their referents and truth-values are (in principle) well-defined.
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• Due to the generality of the term templates described above, it may sometimes
happen that a term does not have a referent. In this case we consider any formula
containing the term to be indeterminate.
• We do not assume that the class of formulas is closed under the application of
unbounded quantifiers: that is, our definition of the class of “formulas” will not
include the usual rule stating that if φ(x) is a formula with x as a free variable, then
‘∃x φ(x)’ and ‘∀x φ(x)’ are both formulas. This may take place in an asymmetric
way: for example, a language may allow unbounded existential quantifiers and
bounded universal quantifiers, but no unbounded universal quantifiers.
• To handle the possible asymmetry described above, we do not assume that the class
of formulas is closed under negation: that is, the usual formula template correspond-
ing to negation may be restricted. Thus, we draw a distinction between formulas to
which the negation operation can be validly applied and those to which it cannot
be applied; we call these formulas “negatable” and “unnegatable” respectively.
• Unnegatable formulas are always considered to be either true or indeterminate, but
never false.
• Like other formulas, atomic formulas may be either negatable or unnegatable. Re-
gardless of whether or not it is negatable, an atomic formula may be indeterminate
(under a given variable assignment) even if it does not contain any terms without
referents, depending on the intended meaning of the formula.
• Due to the need to avoid using set theory as a philosophical foundation of our theory
of truth and reference,54 we will have a somewhat more informal model theory, which
we nevertheless hope can still be considered precise.
• Due to the fact that we are interested in the approximate lengths of proofs, the
precise definition of a proof is more important than it usually is in mathematical
logic, where only the concept of provability is important. We will use a deduction
system similar to natural deduction, but we also introduce a couple of “shortcuts”
that correspond to standard mathematical practice, whose introduction changes the
lengths of proofs without changing the class of provable sentences.
Thus, we define the class of languages we consider as follows:55
Definition A.1. A proposition/term syntax is a list of templates for creating terms and
formulas, as described below. Terms and formulas created using the templates of a propo-
sition/term syntax will be called valid or well-formed with respect to that syntax.
(1) Each template of a proposition/term syntax is a string which includes zero or more
“placeholder” terms, formulas, and variables, with the understanding that the tem-
plate corresponds to a syntax rule allowing the formation of either a term or a for-
mula by replacing the placeholder terms, formulas, and variables of the template by
terms, formulas, and variables of the proposition/term syntax, if necessary. Terms
54The problem with using set theory as a foundation for a theory of truth is that the set-theoretic
definition of truth only makes sense for languages whose domains of discourse are sets, and set theory itself
is not such a language. For set realists, largest number contests will tend to revolve around such languages,
so a more robust theory of truth is needed.
55We do not claim that all of the languages considered in the body of the paper can be put into the
form considered here; indeed, some of them, such as the language GC described in §4.3, cannot be.
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and formulas are then said to be valid with respect to a syntax if they can be con-
structed using finitely many applications of these syntax rules. For example, all
proposition/term syntaxes include the formula templates
‘φ and ψ’, ‘φ or ψ’,
in which φ and ψ are placeholder formulas (cf. (2) below). They correspond to
syntax rules of the form “if φ and ψ are valid formulas, then ‘φ and ψ’ is a valid
formula” and “if φ and ψ are valid formulas, then ‘φ or ψ’ is a valid formula”,
respectively.
(2) There are three types of formula templates:
(2a) The two primitive logical operators are the binary operators ‘and’ and ‘or’,
which we sometimes denote by ‘∧’ and ‘∨’. Note that ‘not’ and ‘implies’ are
not considered primitive logical operators.
(2b) Atomic formula templates take the usual form R(t1, . . . , tn), where R is
a string called a primitive relation and t1, . . . , tn are placeholder terms. If
R is a negatable primitive relation, then ‘¬R(t1, . . . , tn)’ is also an atomic
formula template, though ‘¬R’ is not considered to be a primitive relation.
Here, the background assumption is that to specify a proposition/term syntax,
it is necessary to specify exactly which primitive relations of the syntax are
negatable.
The binary equality relation ‘=’ and the unary existence relation ‘↓’ are consid-
ered to be in the list of primitive relations of every proposition/term language.
For convenience we will use the infix notations ‘t1 = t2’ and ‘t ↓’ in place of the
prefix notations ‘= (t1, t2)’ and ‘↓ (t)’, respectively. The unnegatable formula
‘t ↓’ (“t exists” or “ ‘t’ successfully denotes”) is considered to be true if the
term t has a referent, and to be indeterminate otherwise.
(2c) There are four possible quantifier templates:
‘∀x < t φ(x)’, ‘∃x < t φ(x)’, ‘∀x φ(x)’, ‘∃x φ(x)’,(A.2)
where t is a placeholder term and φ(x) is a placeholder formula that contains
the placeholder variable x as a free variable. The first two templates are said
to contain “bounded quantifiers” while the last two are said to contain “un-
bounded quantifiers”. A proposition/term syntax may contain any subset of
these four templates, possibly leading to an asymmetry with respect to de
Morgan duality. If a proposition/term syntax contains either of the first two
templates, it must also contain an atomic formula template corresponding to a
binary relation ‘<’. However, the symbol ‘<’ is not taken to necessarily connote
a partial order.
(3) There are four types of term templates:
(3a) The term templates for variables, constants, and primitive functions are
the same as in the usual predicate calculus: variables and constants are terms,
and f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term whenever t1, . . . , tn are terms and f is a string known
as a primitive function.
NAMING THE LARGEST NUMBER 39
(3b) The term template for a quantifier-like operator (QLO) takes the form
Ψ(x|t,φ) = Ψ(x1, . . . , xk
∣∣t1, . . . , tn, φ1, . . . , φm
)
where t = (t1, . . . , tn) and φ = (φ1, . . . , φm) are lists of placeholder terms and
formulas, and Ψ is a string (i.e. the “quantifier-like operator”). The opera-
tor Ψ is thought of as “quantifying” over x1, . . . , xk, so that while x1, . . . , xk
may appear free in (the terms and formulas substituted for) t1, . . . , tn and
φ1, . . . , φm, they are considered to be non-free variables with respect to the
formula ‘Ψ(x|t,φ)’.
(4) Although we usually deal with languages with a single domain of discourse, it is easy
to modify the above definition to deal with multiple domains of discourse (i.e. so-
called “many-sorted” languages). In this case each term template, placeholder term,
and placeholder variable must be assigned a domain of discourse, and when using a
template one cannot replace a placeholder term or variable by a term constructed
using a template corresponding to a different domain of discourse. For the quantifier
templates, a different subset of the templates may be considered valid for each
domain of discourse.
Although we do not treat negation as a primitive logical operator, we define the negation
of a valid formula by recursion:
• The negation of a negatable atomic formula ‘R(t1, . . . , tn)’ is ‘¬R(t1, . . . , tn)’, and
vice-versa.
• The negation of a conjuctive, disjunctive, or quantified formula is determined by
the laws of de Morgan duality, for instance
¬‘∃x φ(x)’ = ‘∀x ¬φ(x)’,
assuming that the right-hand side exists and is a valid formula. Note that the
possible lack of symmetry in quantifier templates may lead to some formulas being
unnegatable despite containing no unnegatable atomic formulas.
If φ is a negatable formula then we let
(A.3) D(φ) def= ‘φ or ¬φ’
and we think of D(φ) as asserting “φ has a definite truth-value”.
Although we can be very mathematically rigorous in the definition of the syntax of
a proposition/term language, our description of its semantics may appear a little hazy.
However, when we get to the business of assigning an axiom system to a proposition/term
language, we will be able to be rigorous again.
Definition A.2. A proposition/term language is a proposition/term syntax together with
an intuitive picture of how to interpret the valid terms and formulas of that syntax. Specif-
ically, this intuitive picture must consist of
• an idea of what kind of objects the quantifiers and QLOs are supposed to be quan-
tifying over (i.e. the domain of discourse), and of how to interpret the allowed
quantifier templates;
• for each primitive relation, an idea of what it would mean for a given list of objects
to satisfy the relation;
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• for each negatable primitive relation, an idea of what it would mean for a given list
of objects to fail to satisfy the relation;56
• an idea of which primitive relations are “strongly negatable” in the sense that every
list of objects either satisfies or fails to satisfy the relation;
• for each primitive function, an idea of how it would be applied to a given list of
objects to produce another object;
• for each quantifier-like operator, a reductive interpretation of that operator as de-
scribed below.
Here, a reductive interpretation of a quantifier-like operator Ψ(x|t,φ) is an equivalence of
the form
(A.4) Ψ(x|t,φ) = s ⇔ Θ(x|t, s,φ),
where Θ(x|t, s,φ) is a schematic formula (that is, a formula template constructed according
to the syntax rules of the proposition/term language, but with placeholders terms, formulas,
and variables allowed, as well as a primitive negation operation), written without using
QLOs. The equivalence (A.4) is understood as a conceptual equivalence, meaning that
(A.4) is either understood as giving the intuitive meaning of Ψ, or as following from this
intuitive meaning via a straightforward argument. Note however that (A.4) cannot be
assumed to always give a coherent intuitive meaning to the operator Ψ, since for any
given x, t,φ it may happen that there exist two terms s1, s2 referring to different objects
such that the formulas Θ(x|t, s1,φ) and Θ(x|t, s2,φ) both hold, or else that there exist
s1, s2 referring to the same object such that Θ(x|t, s1,φ) holds but Θ(x|t, s2,φ) does not.
Nevertheless, in many circumstances the formula (A.4) can indeed be understood as giving
an unambiguous meaning to Ψ.
As an example, the quantifier-like operator ‘elt’ (“the unique element of”) has a reductive
interpretation
(A.5) elt{x : φ(x)} = s ⇔ φ(s) and ∀x (s = x or ¬φ(x)),
where φ is a placeholder formula, understood to be negatable. A bounded version of ‘elt’,
with template ‘elt{x < t : φ(x)}’, can be treated similarly. In what follows we assume
that every proposition/term language in which both of the unbounded (resp. bounded)
quantifier templates are allowed also has the unbounded (resp. bounded) version of the
‘elt’ QLO.
We take it as axiomatic that an intuitive picture of the form given above automatically
leads to an intuitive picture of how to interpret any valid term or formula of the syntax of
a proposition/term language, via the method of recursion. Thus, in any sufficiently precise
proposition/term language we can talk about the referent of any term, and the truth-value
of any formula, without ambiguity. However, we do not assume that terms always have
referents or that formulas always have truth-values. Also note that according to our picture
it is impossible for an unnegatable formula to be false, because a proposition/term language
56This may seem pedantic since it is intuitively plausible that if a speaker of a language knows what it
would mean for a sentence to be true, then he also knows what it would mean for the sentence to be false.
However, we have argued against this intuitive assumption in Section 3.
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is not supposed to include an idea of what it would mean for such a formula to be false,
but only an idea of what it would mean for such a formula to be true.
Note that from the syntactic point of view, a proposition/term language still contains two
pieces of information not contained in a proposition/term syntax: a list of which primitive
relations are “strongly negatable”, and a list of “conceptual equivalences” between QLOs
and schematic formulas. These pieces of information will both be important when we define
the notion of a “standard axiomatization”.
Also note that we can define entirely syntactically a class of strongly negatable formulas:
negatable formulas whose atomic subformulas are all strongly negatable and which contain
no subterms constructed via quantifier-like operator templates. According to the intuitive
picture of the proposition/term language, such formulas always have a definite truth-value.
Remark A.3. For the classical mathematician trained in working in ZFC, we could make
the following definition: a proposition/term language is a proposition/term syntax together
with a model for that language, i.e. a set representing the domain(s) of discourse, together
with appropriate relations and functions on that set corresponding to the interpretation of
the primitive relations and functions of the syntax, as well as a list of “strongly negatable”
primitive relations and a list of pairings between QLOs and schematic formulas. However,
this definition does not fully capture what we mean when we talk about “proposition/term
languages”.
It will perhaps be helpful to give an example:
Definition A.4. The language of gradualist number theory (GNT) is the proposition/term
language in which
• the domain of discourse is the natural numbers,
• both bounded and unbounded existential quantifiers are allowed, but only bounded
universal quantifiers are allowed,
• ‘=’ and ‘<’ are binary strongly negatable relations, while ‘↓’ is a unary unnegatable
relation,
• the numerals ‘0’ and ‘1’ are constants, while addition, multiplication, and exponen-
tiation are binary functions,
• in addition to the bounded ‘elt’ operator, there is a quantifier-like operator ‘fst’
which inputs a negatable formula φ(n) with n as a free variable and outputs the
expression ‘fst{n : φ(n)}’, which is conceptually defined via the equivalence
fst{n : φ(n)} = t ⇔ φ(t) and ∀n < t ¬φ(n).
(Verbally, fst{n : φ(n)} is “the first integer n such that φ(n) holds”.)
Since GNT has unbounded existential quantifiers but not unbounded universal quantifiers,
a sentence of the form ‘∃n φ(n)’ is unnegatable, and thus can be either true or indetermi-
nate, but never false. We can motivate this convention by an “algorithmic” interpretation
of the semantics of GNT. Namely, we can imagine an algorithm intended to compute the
truth-value of ‘∃n φ(n)’ that proceeds by computing the truth-values of φ(0), φ(1), . . . in
parallel. If it finds an n such that φ(n) is true, then it returns ‘true’ as the truth-value for
‘∃n φ(n)’, and otherwise it continues the computation indefinitely without ever returning
a value. This algorithm makes sense because observing finitely many n s such that φ(n)
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is false would never allow us to directly conclude that ‘∃n φ(n)’ is false, so a brute-force
algorithm should never return ‘false’ as the truth-value for ‘∃n φ(n)’. Note that if none of
the sentences φ(0), φ(1), . . . are true, then the algorithm will continue to run forever, and
thus in the context of GNT the formula ‘∃n φ(n)’ will remain indeterminate forever.57
Definition A.5. The language of classical number theory (NT) is the same as GNT,
except that unbounded universal quantifiers are allowed.
Due to its algorithmic interpretation, the language of gradualist number theory should
be acceptable to constructivist philosophers, who may be more suspicious of the language
of classical number theory, which does not have such an algorithmic interpretation.
The languagesNT andGNT are representative of two larger classes of proposition/term
languages: the class of classical languages and the class of selfmeta languages, respectively.
We proceed to define these classes and discuss their basic properties:
A.1. Classical languages.
Definition A.6. A proposition/term language is classical if
• it allows unbounded quantification (both universal and existential), and
• all primitive relations except for ‘↓’ are strongly negatable.
Classical proposition/term languages are very similar to the languages of the standard
predicate calculus, but differ in that they allow terms that do not necessarily have referents.
As a consequence, classical proposition/term languages can have formulas that are neither
true nor false (because they contain terms without referents). However, we will now show
that every formula of a classical proposition/term language is canonically equivalent to a
formula which is (in principle) either true or false. We call this equivalent formulation the
Russell reformulation, in honor of Bertrand Russell’s philosophical analysis of the meaning
of the word ‘the’ [7, Chapter XVI], which corresponds to defining the Russell reformulations
of sentences involving the ‘elt’ operator. The concept of Russell reformulations applies just
as well to proposition/term languages that are not classical, although for non-classical
languages Russell reformulations may remain indeterminate.
Definition A.7. Let L be a proposition/term language allowing unbounded existential
quantification. The Russell reformulation of a formula φ of L, which we denote by 〈φ〉, is
defined by the following recursive rules:
1. 〈‘∀x φ(x)’〉 def= ‘∀x 〈φ(x)〉’ and the obvious analogues for ‘∃’, ‘and’, and ‘or’.
2. If R is a primitive relation other than ‘↓’, then
〈R(t1, . . . , tn)〉 def= ‘∃x1, . . . , xn R(x1, . . . , xn) ∧ (t1 → x1) ∧ · · · ∧ (tn → xn)’.
3. 〈‘∀x < t φ(x)’〉 def= ‘∃y (t→ y)∧ ∀x < y 〈φ(x)〉’ and the obvious analogue for ‘∃’.
57From a philosophical point of view, we should warn that the hypothetical “If none of the sentences
φ(0), φ(1), . . . are true” is an outside-view way of looking at things; within the language GNT, there is no
way to talk about all of the sentences φ(0), φ(1), . . . simultaneously being true or false. The reason for this
is that someone who accepts the validity of GNT (for example a constructive mathematician who accepts
it on the basis of the algorithmic interpretation described above) is not committed to accepting the validity
of sentences of the form ‘∀n φ(n)’. See Section 4.
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4. 〈‘t ↓’〉 def= ‘∃x (t→ x)’.
The last three definitions contain expressions of the form (t → x), where t is a term and
x is a variable. The meaning of such expressions is also given recursively, by the following
rules:
1′. If f is a primitive function, then
(f(t1, . . . , tn)→ x) def= ‘∃y1, . . . , yn f(y1, . . . , yn) = x ∧ (t1 → y1) ∧ · · · ∧ (tn → yn)’.
2′. If y is a constant or variable, then (y → x) def= ‘y = x’.
3′. If Ψ is a quantifier-like operator with corresponding schematic formula Θ, then
(Ψ(x|t,φ)→ y) def= 〈Θ(x|t, y,φ)〉.
The idea behind the concept of Russell reformulations is that the Russell formulation of
a formula φ should be equivalent to φ. Similarly, if t is a term and x is a variable then the
formula (t→ x) should be equivalent to the formula ‘t = x’. However, in stating this result
precisely we need to first specify what we mean by “equivalent”; cf. Appendix D. In the
next section we introduce the notion of a standard axiomatization of a proposition/term
language, yielding the following:
Lemma A.8. The Russell reformulation of any formula φ is provably equivalent to φ
relative to any standard axiomatization of L. Similarly, for all t and x the formula (t→ x)
is provably equivalent to ‘t = x’.
Once the notion of a standard axiomatization is defined, the proof of Lemma A.8 is an
easy but tedious induction argument. We will also need the following technical results:
Lemma A.9. In a classical proposition/term language, the Russell reformulation of any
formula is strongly negatable.
Lemma A.10. For all φ and t we have |〈φ〉| = O(|φ|) and |(t → x)| = O(|t|). Here we
recall that |ω| denotes the length of a string ω.
Again, the proofs are easy induction arguments. Note that the above lemmas are all
purely syntactic assertions.
A.2. Selfmeta languages. Like the definition of a proposition/term language, our defini-
tion of a selfmeta language relies upon slightly non-rigorous intuitive concepts. Again, we
will be able to be more rigorous when we talk about axiomatizations.
Definition A.11. A proposition/term language L1 is capable of reproducing another propo-
sition/term language L2 if the domains of discourse, primitive relations, and primitive
functions of L2 are all interpretable in L1; i.e. if
• for each domain of discourse D2 of L2,
– there is domain of discourse D1 of L1 and an intuitive way of “encoding” objects
in D2 as objects in D1;
– there is a corresponding schematic formula of L1 whose intuitive meaning is “x
is an encoded version of an object in D2”;
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– each allowed quantifier template of D2 can be translated into a valid schematic
formula of L1 via the encoding described above; and
• for each primitive relation or function of L2, there is a corresponding schematic
formula or term of L1 whose intuitive meaning can be thought of as being identical
via the encoding.
Definition A.12. A proposition/term language L is capable of producing lists, or list-
compatible, if
• L has only one domain of discourse D;
• L is capable of reproducing GNT;
• given any tuple of objects (a1, . . . , an) inD, one can associate a new object [a1, . . . , an]
in D which can intuitively be thought of as the “list” consisting of the objects
a1, . . . , an;
• there are schematic formulas and terms in L whose intuitive meanings are “x is a
list”, “the nth element of the list x” and “the length of the list x”. We will denote
these formulas and terms by List(x), x[n], and |x|, respectively.
The standard languages GNT, NT, GST, and ST are all list-compatible.
Definition A.13. The metalanguage of a list-compatible proposition/term language L is
the proposition/term language L+ 1 given as follows:
• The domain of discourse D is the same as the domain of discourse of L, and all
templates of L are also templates of L + 1. Note that since L is capable of repro-
ducing GNT, which can talk about strings via the identification of a number with
its binary expansion, L can talk about strings.
• There are two additional templates, corresponding to a new negatable primitive
relation T and a new primitive function R. Let φ and t be terms intended to
represent strings, and let x = (x1, . . . , xk) (resp. a = (a1, . . . , ak)) be a list of terms
intended to represent strings (resp. objects in D).
– The formula T (φ | x = a) (resp. ¬T (φ | x = a)) means “φ (resp. ¬φ) is a true
sentence, given the variable assignment 〈x = a〉”.
– The term R(t | x = a) means “the referent of the term t, given the variable
assignment 〈x = a〉”.
We take it as axiomatic that the intuitive picture of a list-compatible proposition/term
language L automatically leads to an intuitive picture for the metalanguage L+ 1.
A language is selfmeta if it is capable of reproducing its metalanguage.
Theorem A.14 (Tarski’s theorem, rephrased). No classical language can be selfmeta.
Proof sketch. For each schematic term T = T (t), let f(T ) denote the formula ‘¬T (T (‘T ’))’
(here the variable assignment is taken to be trivial). Since the map f is computable, there
exists a schematic term Tf “encoding” f in the sense that for every schematic term T ,
the term Tf(‘T ’) denotes a formula equivalent to f(T ). Then the term Tf (‘Tf ’) denotes a
formula φ equivalent to ‘¬T (Tf(‘Tf ’))’. By the definition of T , the formula φ is equivalent
to its own negation. But since L is classical, φ must be either true or false, and either
assumption leads to a contradiction. 
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To make this proof more rigorous, we would first have to make clear what kind of proof
we are looking for, since the claim is not a purely syntactic one. In the next section we
introduce the notion of an axiomatization, and the above proof can be made rigorous in
the sense that it can be formalized in any standard axiomatization of a classical selfmeta
language. We would also have to make clear what we mean by “equivalent”: we can let it
mean “provably equivalent with respect to a fixed standard axiomatization A”.
Appendix B. Axiomatizations
We now turn to the question of what sort of axiom system is appropriate for a proposi-
tion/term language. Due to the fact that ‘implies’ is not a primitive logical operator, these
axiom systems will need to depend more heavily on rules of inference than standard axiom
systems do.
Definition B.1. An axiomatization of a proposition/term language L is a list of axiom
schemas and inference rules. An axiom schema is simply a schematic formula, and an infer-
ence rule is a string of the form Ψ1(t,φ), . . . ,Ψk(t,φ)⇒ Ψ0(t,φ), where Ψ0(t,φ), . . . ,Ψk(t,φ)
are schematic formulas containing the placeholder terms and formulas t and φ.
In the remainder of this definition we fix a proposition/term language L and an axiom-
atization A. A proof step is a sentence taking one of the following forms:
(1) ‘Assume φ’
(2) ‘Then φ’
(3) ‘Fix x[< t]’
(4) ‘Find x[< t] such that φ(x)’
(5) ‘Case 1/2: φ’
(6) ‘Fix m such that φ(m)’
In (3) and (4), the brackets mean that ‘< t’ should be included or not corresponding to the
allowed quantifier templates of L (with (3) corresponding to universal quantifiers and (4)
corresponding to existential quantifiers). In (5), ‘1/2’ means that either ‘1’ or ‘2’ should be
written here. A step of type (1) is called a global hypothesis, while a step of type (2) is called
an inference, while a step one of the types (3)-(6) is called an intermediate hypothesis. If Sk
is a steps of one of the types (1),(2),(4),(5),(6), then the formula φ is called the conclusion
of Sk.
A proof with global free variables x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a finite list of proof steps S1, . . . , Sℓ,
together with a binary “dependence” relation between the steps, with the following prop-
erties:
(I) Each step depends only on steps preceding it, and dependence is transitive.
(II) The set of steps depending on Sj is of the form {Sj+1, . . . , Sk} for some k.
(III) If a variable y appears free in the conclusion of of a step Sk, then either y is a global
free variable (i.e. a member of x), or Sk depends on a step Sj of type (3) or (4)
“introducing” y.
(IV) All global hypotheses appear consecutively at the beginning of the proof.
(V) The last step is an inference that depends only on global hypotheses and inferences.
The conclusion of the last step is called the global conclusion of the proof.
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(VI) A step Sk of type (4) always depends on a prior step Sj whose conclusion is of the
form ∃x[< t] φ(x), where φ(x) is the conclusion of Sk.
(VII) Steps of type (5) come in pairs: if Sk1 is of the form ‘Case 1: φ1’, then there exists
Sk2 of the form ‘Case 2: φ2’ such that both Sk1 and Sk2 depend directly on a prior
step Sj whose conclusion is of the form φ1 ∨ φ2. Here, “depend directly” means that
Sk1 and Sk2 do not depend on any steps other than Sj and the steps that Sj depends
on.
(VIII) A step Sk is said to “relatively depend” on an inference Sj modulo a third step Si if
Sj depends on Si, and all other steps that Sj depends on either are inferences or are
also steps that Sk depends on.
(IX) If Sk is an inference with conclusion φ, then one of the following is true:
(2a) There is an axiom schema of which φ is an instance.
(2b) There is an inference rule Ψ1, . . . ,Ψk ⇒ Ψ0 such that φ is an instance of Ψ0 while
all of the corresponding instances of Ψ1, . . . ,Ψk are the conclusions of prior steps
that Sk depends on.
(2c) (Generalization) Sk relatively depends on a step of the form ‘Then µ(x)’ modulo
a step of the form ‘Fix x[< t]’, where φ = ∀x[< t] µ(x).
(2d) (Specification) Sk relatively depends on a step of the form ‘Then φ’ modulo a
step of the form ‘Find x[< t] such that µ(x)’, and depends on the corresponding
step with conclusion ∃x[< t] µ(x), and x does not appear free in φ.
(2e) (Division into cases) For each i = 1, 2, Sk relatively depends on a step of the
form ‘Then φ’ modulo a step of the form ‘Case i: µi’, and depends on the
corresponding step with conclusion µ1 ∨ µ2.
(2f) (Induction) Sk relatively depends on a step of the form ‘Then µ(m+1)’ modulo
a step of the form ‘Fix m such that µ(m)’, and depends on steps with formula
µ(0) and t ↓, where φ = µ(t).58
Definition B.2. If there is a proof with global free variables x, global hypotheses φ1(x), . . . , φk(x),
and global conclusion ψ(x), then ψ(x) is said to be relatively provable from φ1(x), . . . , φk(x).
In this case, the string
(B.1) ‘∀x φ1(x), . . . , φk(x) ⇒ ψ(x)’
is said to be a theorem of the axiom system in question, and the proof in question is said
to be a proof of this theorem. In general, strings of the form (B.1) are called implications
or conditional sentences. Note that implications are not syntactically valid formulas, since
they involve the implication symbol ‘⇒’, as well as unbounded universal quantification
(which may or may not be allowed in the proposition/term language under consideration).
If k = 0 and x = () is the empty list, then ψ is called absolutely provable or just provable.
If ‘∀x φ(x) ⇒ ψ(x)’ and ‘∀x ψ(x) ⇒ φ(x)’ are both theorems, then
(B.2) ‘∀x φ(x) ⇔ ψ(x)’
is also said to be a theorem. In general, strings of the form (B.2) are called equivalences.
58One can also consider more general forms of induction such as transfinite induction. For simplicity we
consider here only induction over the natural numbers.
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We will use the notation φ⇒A ψ as shorthand for ‘The implication ‘φ⇒ ψ’ is a theorem
of the axiom system A’.
Definition B.3. An axiomatization A of a proposition/term language L is standard if it:
(1) A contains all of the following axiom schemata and inference rules:
φ ∧ ψ ⇒ φ; φ ∧ ψ ⇒ ψ; φ, ψ ⇒ φ ∧ ψ; φ ⇒ φ ∨ ψ; ψ ⇒ φ ∨ ψ; φ ∧ ¬φ ⇒ ψ;
x ↓; c ↓; f(t1, . . . , tn) ↓ ⇔ t1 ↓ ∧ · · · ∧ tn ↓; R(t1, . . . , tn) ⇒ ti ↓;
t ↓ ⇒ t = t; t1 = t2 ⇒ T (t1) = T (t2); t1 = t2, φ(t1) ⇒ φ(t2);
(2) A contains all of the following inference rules allowed by its quantifier templates:
φ(t) ⇒ ∃x φ(x); ∀x φ(x), t ↓ ⇒ φ(t);
t1 < t2 ∧ φ(t1) ⇒ ∃x < t2 φ(x); ∀x < t2 φ(x), t1 < t2 ⇒ φ(t1);
∀x < t φ(x) ⇒ t ↓;
∀x D(φ(x)) ⇒ D(∀x φ(x)); ∀x < t D(φ(x)) ⇒ D(∀x < t φ(x));(B.3)
where in (B.3) we use the notation (A.3).
(3) A contains all reductive interpretations of quantifier-like operators, i.e. equivalences
of the form Φ(x|t,φ) = s⇔ Θ(x|t, s,φ);
(4) For every strongly negatable primitive relation R, A contains the inference rule
t1 ↓, . . . , tn ↓ ⇒ D(R(t1, . . . , tn));
where we use the notation (A.3);
(5) If L is list-compatible, then A contains corresponding inference rules allowing it to
handle lists, for example
List(t1), t2 < |t1| ⇒ t1[t2] ↓
as well as the standard arithmetical axioms for numbers (we do not write down a
complete list of the necessary axioms);
(6) If L is selfmeta, then A contains corresponding inference rules allowing it to handle
the notions of truth and reference, see Definition B.6 below. However, a standard
axiom system need not contain any inference rule of the form (B.4).
Note that we could also consider a slightly weaker notion of a standard axiom system,
namely one where (1)-(6) are required to be theorems but not inference rules. This technical
distinction will be of no significance to us.
Lemma B.4. Suppose that the implications φ⇒ µ and ψ ⇒ ν are theorems of a standard
axiomatization of a proposition/term language. Then the implications
(A) φ ∧ ψ ⇒ µ ∧ ν
(B) φ ∨ ψ ⇒ µ ∨ ν
(C) ∃x[< t] φ(x)⇒ ∃x[< t] µ(x)
(D) ∀x[< t] φ(x)⇒ ∀x[< t] µ(x)
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are also theorems. Moreover if φ ⇒ µ and ψ ⇒ ν can be proven in m and n symbols
respectively, then (A) and (B) can be proven in m + n + O(1) symbols while (C) and (D)
can be proven in m+O(1) symbols.
We leave the proof as an exercise to the reader, noting that it makes crucial use of
(2c)-(2e) of Definition B.1.
The inference rules (B.3), or the rules for conservation of precision under quan-
tification (CPQ), deserve further comment. They function as a partial substitute for
the axiom schema of excluded middle, since they describe circumstances in which certain
formulas (namely universally quantified ones) may be inferred to be either true or false.
The other axiom that functions as a partial substitute for the axiom schema of excluded
middle is the axiom of excluded middle for atomic formulas, i.e. (4). Together, these two
axioms can be used to prove the following:
Theorem B.5. Every strongly negatable statement is definite.
B.1. Meta-axiomatizations. Just as every proposition/term language has a metalan-
guage, so also every axiomatization of a proposition/term language can be extended into
an axiomatization of the metalanguage.
Definition B.6. Let A be a standard axiomatization of a list-compatible proposition/term
language L. The metasystem of A, denoted A+ 1, is the standard axiomatization of L+ 1
consisting of the axiom schemata and inference rules of A, together with the following
inference rules concerning the primitive relation T and the primitive function R:
T (‘∀x[< t] φ(x)’) ⇔ ∀a[< R(t)] T (φ(x)|x = a), T (φ ∧ ψ) ⇔ T (φ) ∧ T (ψ),
T (‘∃x[< t] φ(x)’) ⇔ ∃a[< R(t)] T (φ(x)|x = a), T (φ ∨ ψ) ⇔ T (φ) ∨ T (ψ),
T ([¬]R(t1, . . . , tn)) ⇔ [¬]R(R(t1), . . . ,R(tn)),
R(f(t1, . . . , tn)) ↓ ⇒ R(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(R(t1), . . . ,R(tn)),
R(t1) ↓, . . . ,R(tn) ↓ ⇒ R(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(R(t1), . . . ,R(tn)),
R(c) = c, R(x | x = a) = a,
(B.4) T (φ), φ⇒A ψ ⇒ T (ψ).
as well as the relativizations of these inference rules to an arbitrary variable assignment
〈x = a〉. Note that in (B.4), the formula φ ⇒A ψ is being interpreted as a syntactic
sentence about the strings φ and ψ.
We also define the weak metasystem of A, denoted (A+1)∗, to be the system consisting
of all axiom schemata and rules of inference of A+ 1 except for (B.4).
B.2. Shorthand. The definition of a “proof” given in Definition B.1 to a great extent
matches what mathematicians mean when they talk about a “proof”. However, one impor-
tant difference is the common mathematical practice of allowing proofs to include their own
notation and definitions. This difference is significant because allowing such shorthand may
significantly decrease the size of a proof. Thus, we formalize the notion of mathematical
shorthand as follows:
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Definition B.7. A proof with shorthand in an axiom system (L,A) consists of the following:
• A finite list of shorthand definitions. A shorthand definition is an expression of the
form
R(x)
def
= Φ(x) or f(x)
def
= T (x),
where on the left-hand side, R is an undefined string (i.e. a string with no previously
assigned meaning), and Φ is a schematic formula, while on the right-hand side, f
is an undefined string and T is a schematic term. The string R is subsequently
interpreted as a relation and the string f is subsequently interpreted as a function.
The schematic formula or term appearing in a shorthand definition may contain
relations or functions defined by previous shorthand definitions.
• A proof in the sense of Definition B.1 for the axiom system (L′, A′), where L′ is the
language formed by augmenting L with the relations and functions of the shorthand
definitions, and A′ is the axiom system formed by augmenting A with the axiom
schemata f(x) = T (x) and the inference rules R(x)⇔ Φ(x).
Appendix C. Proofs
All proofs in this section should be understood as proofs in the axiom system A + 1,
where A is any standard axiomatization of L, or a specific standard axiomatization if this
is mentioned. If we use the inference rule (B.4) in a proof, then we will indicate this by
writing that we assume the axiom system A is “valid”.
Note. On a philosophical level, one can ask what the proofs in this section actually
allow us to conclude. A trivial answer is that they allow us to conclude that for any
proposition/term syntax L and standard axiomatization A, the theorems stated in this
section are theorems of the axiom system A+1. A more interesting answer is that whenever
L is a proposition/term language, that is, a proposition/term syntax together with an
intuitive idea of its meaning as described in Definition A.2, and whenever A is a valid
axiomatization of it, that is, one that formalizes accepted methods of reasoning within L,
then the conclusions of the theorems of this section are true (whenever the premises are
satisfied).
Definition C.1. Let L be a proposition/term language capable of reproducing GNT. Let
t(m) be a term and let φ(m) be a negatable formula, in both cases with m as a free variable
intended to represent a number. Then we write
‘max{t(m) : m ≤ n, φ(m)}’ def= ‘fst{k : ∀m < n+ 1 φ(m)⇒ t(m) ≤ k}’
where ⇒ denotes material implication (i.e. φ⇒ ψ is shorthand for ¬φ ∨ ψ).
It is easy to see that this definition captures the intuitive notion of “the maximum of
t(m) over all m ≤ n such that φ(m) holds”.
Definition C.2. A formula or term is quantifier-free if it does not contain any quantifiers
or quantifier-like operators. A formula is Σ1 if it is of the form ∃x φ(x), where φ is a
quantifier-free formula.
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Although the sentence ‘φ is true’, where φ is a general formula, cannot necessarily be
translated into L, we will show now how to translate this sentence in the case where φ is
quantifier-free.
Definition C.3. Let L be a list-compatible proposition/term language allowing unbounded
existential quantification and let φ be a quantifier-free formula of L. A verification of φ
(relative to a given variable assignment) is an assignment of truth-values to the subformulas
of φ, together with an assignment of values to the subterms of φ, satisfying the obvious
constraints, and such that φ is assigned the truth-value ‘true’.
If Φ = ‘∃x φ(x)’ is a Σ1 formula, then a verification of Φ relative to a variable assignment
〈y = b〉 is a pair (a, V ), where V is a verification of φ(x) relative to the variable assignment
〈y = b, x = a〉.
Then we can translate ‘φ is true’ into L as ‘φ has a verification’. Although the validity
of this translation is intuitively clear, we note that one way to justify it is by appealing to
the fact that ‘for all φ, φ is true if and only if φ has a verification’ is a theorem of A+ 1.
In the theorems below, when we say that one strategy wins against another, we mean
that this is true for all sufficiently large values of n. In fact, numbers such as n = 10100
are sufficiently large for this purpose (given physically realistic constraints on the setup),
though we will not prove this explicitly.
Theorem C.4 (Cf. Theorem 1.2). Let L be a classical list-compatible proposition/term
language. Then for each number n, there is a term φ(n) of L of length O(n) whose referent
is the largest number that can be represented in L by a term of length ≤ n. The term φ(n)
can be written explicitly.
Proof. We leave it to the reader to check:
• Any term t in L is provably equivalent to a term of the form ‘elt{x : Φt(x)}’, where
Φt is a formula with one free variable. Here, two terms t1 and t2 are said to be
provably equivalent if the formulas t1 = x and t2 = x are provably equivalent, where
x is a variable that does not appear free in t1 or t2, with respect to any standard
axiomatization of L.
• For any n ≥ |t|, the formula Φt can be chosen to take the form
(C.1) Φt(x) = ‘∀y1 ∃z1 · · · ∀yn ∃zn φt,n(x, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn)’,
where φt is a quantifier-free formula with 2n + 1 free variables. (For more details
see the proof of Theorem C.11 below.)
• There is an algorithm that computes φt,n as a function of t and n. In particular,
the function (t, n) 7→ φt,n is definable in NT and thus also in L.
Using Definition C.3, we can see that the term
φ(n)
def
= ‘max{Valn(t) : t ∈ L, |t| ≤ n, 〈Valn(t) ∈ N〉}’
has the desired property, where Valn(t) is shorthand for
elt{x : ∀y1 ∃z1 · · · ∀yn ∃zn φt,n is satisfied by x, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn}
and 〈φ〉 denotes the Russell reformulation of a sentence φ (cf. Definition A.7). 
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Theorem C.5 (Cf. Theorem 1.5). Let A be a valid axiomatization of a proposition/term
language L capable of reproducing GNT. For each n, there is a program of length O(log(n))
encoding an algorithm that succeeds at computing the largest number which is the output of
some algorithm for which there is a proof in A of length59 ≤ n that this algorithm halts.
This program can be written explicitly.
Proof. The algorithm in question can be given as follows: For each string of n symbols,
check whether that string is a proof in A that some algorithm α halts. If it is, run α and
store the value it returns. After all strings have been checked, return the largest stored
value.
This algorithm can be encoded as a program whose length is equal to a constant plus
the number of symbols needed to encode the number n, which is O(log(n)).
Finally, to prove that the algorithm halts, we need to verify that whenever there is a
proof in A that an algorithm α halts of length at most n, then the algorithm α in fact
halts. But this is a special case of (B.4). 
Corollary C.6 (Cf. Corollary 1.6). Let (L1, A1) and (L2, A2) be valid axiom systems, and
suppose that the axiom system (L1, A1) is at least as powerful as the metasystem (L2 +
1, A2 + 1) in the sense that L1 is capable of reproducing L2 + 1, and all axioms and rules
of inference of A2+ 1 are theorems of A1. Then in the Busy Beaver contest, the axiomatic
strategy of (L1, A1) wins agains the axiomatic strategy of (L2, A2).
Proof. Let ρn(A2) be the algorithm given by the previous theorem. Then the previous proof
shows that the sentence ‘ρn(A2) halts and outputs a number’ can be proven in A2+1, and
thus in A1, using O(log(n)) symbols. Consequently for all m ≫ log(n), the output of
ρn(A2) is a term in the maximum computed by ρm(A1). So the output of ρm(A1) is larger
than the output of ρn(A2). 
Theorem C.7 (Cf. Theorem 2.4). Let L1 and L2 be proposition/term languages, such that
L1 is capable of reproducing L2. Let A be a valid standard axiomatization of L1. Then for
each n, there is a term φ(n) of L2 + 1 of length O(log(n)) which succeeds at referring to
the largest number named by any term t such that A proves that t succeeds at naming a
number using less than n symbols. This term can be written explicitly. If L2 is selfmeta,
the term can be translated into L2.
Proof. Clearly, the formula ‘A proves that t succeeds at naming a number using less than n
symbols’ can be translated into GNT, and thus in L2+1, as a strongly negatable formula,
and by Theorem B.5, such a formula is definite. This implies that the phrase ‘the largest
number ... less than n symbols’ can be translated into L2 + 1 in a straightforward way
using Definition C.1. The length of the resulting term will be equal to a constant times the
number of symbols needed to name n in L2 + 1, which is O(log(n)).
Finally, to prove that the resulting term names a number, we need to verify that whenever
there is a proof in A that a term t names a number, then t in fact names a number. Again,
this is a special case of (B.4). 
59Here we define the length of a proof to be the sum of the lengths of its steps.
52 DAVID SIMMONS
Corollary C.8 (Cf. Corollary 2.5). Let L∗ be a selfmeta language, and let (L1, A1) and
(L2, A2) be valid axiom systems capable of reproducing L∗. Suppose in addition that A1 is
at least as powerful as the metasystem A2 + 1. Then in the largest number contest of L∗,
the axiomatic strategy of A1 wins against the axiomatic strategy of A2.
Proof. Let tn(A2) be the term given by the previous theorem. Then the previous proof
shows that the sentence ‘tn(A2) names a number’ can be proven in A2+1, and thus in A1,
using O(log(n)) symbols. Consequently the number named by tn(A2) appears as a term
in the maximum occuring in the term tm(A1), whenever m ≥ O(log(n)). So the number
named by tm(A1) is larger than the number named by tn(A2). 
Theorem C.9 (Cf. Theorem 2.3). Let L1 and L2 be two proposition/term languages, at
least one of which is classical, and suppose that L1 is capable of reproducing the metalan-
guage L2 + 1. Then for any n, the phrase ‘the largest number that can be represented in
L2 using at most n symbols’ can be translated into L1 as a term of length O(log(n)) which
succeeds at naming a number. In particular, in any philosophical largest number contest in
which both strategies are considered valid, the linguistic strategy of L1 will win against the
linguistic strategy of L2.
Proof. First of all, the formula ‘t is a term of L2 that succeeds at naming a number using
less than n symbols’ can be translated into the metalanguage of L2. If L2 is classical, then
this formula is definite and negatable in L2+1, and if L1 is classical, the formula is definite
and negatable in L1. Thus using Definition C.1, the phrase given in the theorem can be
translated into L1. It is easy to see that the term transcribing this phrase is of length
O(log(n)) and succeeds at naming a number.
Thus, there is a strategy for the largest number contest of L1 which will win against any
entry for the largest number contest of L2, and in particular against the linguistic strategy.
Since the linguistic strategy of L1 is nearly optimal, it will also win against the linguistic
strategy of L2. 
The following theorem is motivated by Theorem 1.8, but importantly different from it:
Theorem C.10. Let A be a standard axiomatization of L = GNT. Then for each n, the
implication
(C.2) ∀φ, ψ, 〈x = a〉 T (φ(x) | x = a), φ⇒A,n ψ ⇒ T (ψ(x) | x = a)
can be proven in A using O(n log(n)) symbols. Here φ ⇒A,n ψ means ‘the implication
φ⇒ ψ can be proven in A using ≤ n nested inductions’.
Proof. We begin with a definition. Let ρ be a proof, and let 〈x = a〉 be a variable assign-
ment. A partial validation of ρ of length k with respect to 〈x = a〉 is a finite list of pairings
between steps and variable assignments such that for each step Sj, if Vj denotes the set of
variable assignments paired with Sj, then
• V−1 = {〈x = a〉};
• if 〈y = b〉 ∈ Vj , and Sj is not of type (3) (cf. Definition B.1), then the conclusion
of Sj is true relative to the assignment 〈y = b〉;
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and if furthermore j ≤ k and Sj does not depend on any steps of type (6), then the following
conditions hold where Si is the last step that Sj depends on, unless Sj does not depend on
any other steps in which case we let i = −1:60
• if Sj is of type (1) or (2), then Vj = Vi;
• if Sj is of the form ‘Fix z < t(y)’, then for each 〈y = b〉 ∈ Vi and for each
c < R(t(y) | y = b), we have 〈y = b, z = c〉 ∈ Vj ;
• if Sj is of the form ‘Find z’, then for each 〈y = b〉 ∈ Vj−1 there exists c such that
〈y = b, z = c〉 ∈ Vj;
• if Sj is of the form ‘Case 1: φ1’, then Vj ∪ Vj′ = Vi, where j′ is the corresponding
step of the form ‘Case 2: φ2’.
We now proceed with the proof by induction on n. We will show that (C.2) can be proven
in ≤ Cf(n) symbols, where
f(n) = (n+ 2) log(n + 3)
and C is a large constant. Note that when n = −1, (C.2) is trivially provable because
it is vacuously true. Thus, fix n ≥ −1 and suppose that (C.2) can be proven in A using
≤ Cf(n) symbols. Now A can reason as follows:
“Let φ, ψ, 〈x = a〉 satisfy T (φ(x) | x = a) and φ⇒A,n+1 ψ. Then there is a proof ρ in A
of φ ⇒ ψ using ≤ n + 1 nested inductions. We will prove by induction that for all k ≤ ℓ,
there exists a partial validation of ρ of length k for the variable assignment 〈x = a〉.
“Fix k < ℓ and suppose that there exists a partial validation of ρ of length k. Let
j = k + 1. We need to show that the partial validation can be extended to a partial
validation of length j. If Sj is not of type (2f), then the proof is tedious and left as an
exercise to the reader.
“If Sj is of type (2f), then fix a variable assignment 〈y = b〉 ∈ Vj = Vi. We need to show
that the conclusion of Sj, which we denote by µ(y, t(y)), is true relative to 〈y = b〉. For
ease of notation we assume that 〈y = b〉 = 〈〉 is the trivial assignment.
“Fix m and suppose that φ′ = µ(m) is true. By the structure of ρ, the inference
µ(m) ⇒ µ(m+ 1) is provable in A using ≤ n nested inductions. So [insert proof of (C.2)
using less than ≤ Cf(n) symbols], and thus ψ′ = µ(m + 1) is true. Thus by induction,
µ(R(t)) is true, and thus µ(t) is true.
“Thus there exists a partial validation of ρ of length j = k + 1. So by induction, there
exists a partial validation of ρ of length ℓ. Since by assumption Sℓ depends only on global
hypotheses and inferences, we have Vℓ = V−1 = {〈x = a〉} and thus the conclusion of Sℓ is
true relative to 〈x = a〉.”
The length of this proof is ≤ Cf(n) + O(log(n)),61 so if C is chosen appropriately then
the length is ≤ Cf(n+ 1). This completes the inductive step. 
Theorem C.11 (Cf. Theorem 1.8). Let L be a classical list-compatible proposition/term
language, and let A be a standard axiomatization of L. Then for each n, the sentence ‘every
Σ1 sentence provable in A using ≤ n nested quantifiers is true’ (where by ‘is true’, we mean
60Note that by condition (II) of Definition B.1, Sj directly depends on Si.
61Note that the length O(log(n)) is required not only to keep track of the numeral n appearing in the
proof, but also to distinguish between the different variables that appear at different levels of nesting.
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‘has a verification’ as per Definition C.3) can be proven in A using O(n2 log(n)) symbols,
or O(n log(n)) if we allow shorthand.
Proof. First we consider the case where shorthand is allowed. For each i ∈ N, we will call
a formula Φ an i-formula if it is of the form
(C.3) Φ(x) = ‘∀yi ∃zi · · · ∀y1 ∃z1 φ(x,y, z)’,
where φ is a quantifier-free formula. (The reason for the decreasing indices will be apparent
later.) In particular, a formula is a 0-formula if and only if it is quantifier free.
The following description of shorthand can be translated into L: “A 0-formula is said to
be 0-true relative to a variable assignment 〈x = a〉 if it has a verification (cf. Definition
C.3). A 1-formula Φ = ‘∀y1 ∃z1 φ(x, y1, z1)’ is said to be 1-true relative to a variable
assignment 〈x = a〉 if φ is a 0-formula such that for all b, there exists c such that φ is true
relative to the variable assignment 〈x = a, y1 = b, z1 = c〉. [Repeat the previous sentence n
times, each time incrementing all numerical values by 1.]” We remark that an i-formula is
i-true if and only if it is true, though this fact will not be needed for the proof.
To compute the length of the description of shorthand in the previous paragraph, we
observe that it consists of n definitions of shorthand, each of which must refer to some
natural number between 0 and n (e.g. via its binary expansion). Thus each definition is of
length O(log(n)), and the length of the sequence of definitions is O(n log(n)).
Remark. The shorthand description “For all i < n, an (i + 1)-formula Φ is said to be
(i + 1)-true if [etc]” cannot be translated into L, because our shorthand conventions (cf.
Definition B.7) do not allow recursive definitions. Allowing shorthand to include recursive
definitions changes the situation, and we do not analyze the modified version here.
Now for each i, j ≤ n such that i ≤ j, we define the j-extension of an i-formula Φ to be
the formula ‘∀yj ∃zj · · · ∀yi+1 ∃zi+1 Φ(x)’. Note that since the notion of a j-extension is
purely syntactic, it can be defined in L simultaneously for all j. An i-formula Φ is said to
be j-true relative to a variable assignment 〈x = a〉 if the j-extension of Φ is j-true relative
to 〈x = a〉.
Now for each j < n, the L-formula Ξ(j) = ‘For every i ≤ j, for every i-formula Φ, and
for every variable assignment 〈x = a〉, Φ is j-true relative to 〈x = a〉 if and only if Φ is
(j + 1)-true relative to 〈x = a〉’ can be proven in A using O(log(n)) symbols. Now let
Θ(j) denote the L-formula ‘For every i ≤ j, for every i-formula Φ, and for every variable
assignment 〈x = a〉, Φ is j-true relative to 〈x = a〉 if and only if Φ is n-true relative to
〈x = a〉’. Note that both Ξ(j) and Θ(j) are sentences rather than merely implications
due to our assumption that the language L is classical. Now for all j < n, the implication
Θ(j + 1) ∧ Ξ(j) ⇒ Θ(j) can be proven in A using O(log(n)) symbols. Since Θ(n) is
trivially provable, it follows that Θ(1), . . . ,Θ(n) can be simultaneously proven in A using
O(n log(n)) symbols.
A division into cases of the form i = i0 shows that A can prove the following sentence
using O(n log(n)) symbols:
(∗) For every i < n, for every (i + 1)-formula Φ = ‘∀yi+1 ∃zi+1 φ(x, yi+1, zi+1)’, and
for every variable assignment 〈x = a〉, Φ is n-true relative to 〈x = a〉 if and only
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if for all b, there exists c such that φ is n-true relative to the variable assignment
〈x = a, yi+1 = b, zi+1 = c〉.
This completes the part of the proof where we need to keep track of the length of the proofs
in A. In the remainder of the proof, we will simply use (∗) as a black box and use reasoning
that can entirely be formalized in A (using O(1) symbols). The following lemma shows
that the conjunction operator ‘and’ interacts nicely with the notion of n-truth:
Lemma C.12. Fix i, j ≤ n with i+j ≤ n. Let Φ be an i-formula, and let Ψ be a j-formula.
Then there exists an (i + j)-formula Θ (computed explicitly from Φ and Ψ) such that for
any variable assignment 〈x = a〉, Θ is n-true relative to 〈x = a〉 if and only if Φ and Ψ
are both n-true relative to 〈x = a〉.
Proof. If
Φ(x) = ‘∀yi ∃zi · · · ∀y1 ∃z1 φ(x,y, z)’
Ψ(x) = ‘∀yj ∃zj · · · ∀y1 ∃z1 ψ(x,y, z)’
then we let
Θ(x) = ‘∀yi+j ∃zi+j · · · ∀y1 ∃z1 φ(x,yi1, zi1) ∧ ψ(x,yi+ji+1, zi+ji+1)’.
To prove that Θ has the desired property, we apply induction on j and use (∗). 
Similar lemmas can be proved for the ‘or’ operator and for both types of quantifiers.
These lemmas can be used to define the prefix version of any formula that can be written
using ‘and’, ‘or’, quantifiers, and quantifier-free formulas, i.e. any formula that does not
contain quantifier-like operators. Since the Russell reformulation of a formula does not
contain quantifier-like operators, this motivates the following definitions:
• a formula φ is n-true relative to a variable assignment 〈x = a〉 if the prefix version
of the Russell reformulation 〈φ〉 is n-true relative to 〈x = a〉;
• the n-referent of a term t relative to a variable assignment 〈x = a〉 is the unique
object b (if one exists) such that the prefix version of the formula (t→ y) is n-true
relative to the assignment 〈x = a, y = b〉.
By Lemma A.10, there exists a constant C such that if |φ| ≤ n/C (resp. |t| ≤ n/C),
then the prefix version of 〈φ〉 (resp. (t → y)) is an i-formula for some i < n. Thus, these
definitions provide a way for L to partially reproduce the metalanguage L + 1, subject
to the restriction that the notions of truth and reference are only used for formulas and
terms of length ≤ n/C. It is routine to check that all axiom schemata and inference rules
of the metasystem A + 1 except for (B.4) are theorems of A + (*).62 Thus since the proof
of Theorem C.13 can be formalized in (A + 1)∗, its relativized version can be proven in
A+(*).63 But this relativized version says that every sentence provable in A using less than
62In order to check the forward direction of the equivalence on the third line, one first needs to prove by
induction on |t| that there can be at most one b such that the prefix version of (t → y) is n-true relative
to the variable assignment 〈x = a, y = b〉.
63Note that there is something to check here, namely that the proof of Theorem C.13 does not rely on
the notions of truth and reference for formulas and terms that are significantly longer than the proof whose
conclusion we wish to show is true.
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n/C symbols is n-true, and it is easy to check that for Σ1 sentences, n-truth coincides with
the notion of truth given by Definition C.3. This completes the proof.
If we are not allowed to use shorthand, then each time the notion of i-truth appears in
the proof it must be expanded in full, which costs O(n log(n)) symbols instead of O(log(n)).
So the final length would be O(n2 log(n)) rather than O(n log(n)). 
Theorem C.13 (In (A+1)∗). Let A be a valid axiomatization of a classical list-compatible
proposition/term language L. Then for each n, the sentence (C.2) is true, where φ⇒A,n ψ
means ‘the implication φ⇒ ψ can be proven using ≤ n nested steps’.
Note that (C.2) is a sentence rather than an implication because of the assumption that
L is classical.
Proof. Clearly, (C.2) is true for n = −1. Suppose that (C.2) is true, and fix φ, ψ, 〈x = a〉
such that φ(x) is true relative to 〈x = a〉 and φ⇒A,n+1 ψ. Let ρ be the proof of φ⇒ ψ. We
will prove by induction that if Sj is an inference that does not depend on any intermediate
hypotheses, then the conclusion of Sj is true relative to 〈x = a〉. Indeed, suppose that Sj
is of type (2c), with conclusion ∀y µ(y). Let ν1, . . . , νr be the conclusions of the steps that
Sj depends on. Then the implication ν1, . . . , νr ⇒ µ(y) is provable in A using ≤ n nested
steps. Since ν1, . . . , νr are all true relative to 〈x = a〉, it follows that for all b, µ(y) is true
relative to 〈x = a, y = b〉 and thus by the induction hypothesis ∀y µ(y) is true. The other
cases are similar. This completes the induction with respect to Sj . Letting Sj be the last
step of ρ, we see that ψ is true relative to 〈x = a〉, which completes the induction with
respect to n. 
Appendix D. Implication and induction
The meaning of implication. A fundamental tool in mathematical and philosophical
thought is hypothetical reasoning, the mode of reasoning in which a reasoner “pretends” that
a certain hypothesis is true and then observes what kind of conclusions his mind generates
based on this “information”. For example, a mathematician may pretend that the symbol
‘n’ denotes a number and then perform manipulations under this pretense, for example
concluding that the sentence ‘n + n = 2n’ is true. The implicit claim is that knowing
the results of hypothetical reasoning can be useful when encountering new situations. For
example, if the mathematician decides that he will temporarily let the symbol ‘n’ denote
the number 10100, then the existence of his previous hypothetical reasoning gives him
good reason to believe that the sentence ‘10100 + 10100 = 2 · 10100’ is true, and thus that
10100 + 10100 = 2 · 10100.
It is worth analyzing more closely the thought process of a reasoner who applies previ-
ously performed hypothetical reasoning to a current situation. The thought process must
go something like “I was reasoning well then, and if I reasoned in the same way regard-
ing the current situation, then I would come to the same conclusion as I did when I was
reasoning hypothetically. Thus, I can save myself the time and effort of re-reasoning by
simply accepting that the conclusion of my previous reasoning holds in the new situation.”
We should point out that this kind of reasoning is not always valid. First of all, it is not
necessarily true that if the reasoner reasoned in the same way in the new situation, he
would reach the same conclusion. He might notice flaws in the reasoning that were not
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noticed when he was just pretending. Secondly, even if he would reason in the same way,
the resulting reasoning could be invalid even though he would accept it. In this case, the
reasoner is still correct that he can save himself time and effort by accepting the conclusion
of the hypothetical reasoning in the current situation, but he is simply getting to nowhere
faster.
The more serious difficulty is that the notion of “reasoning well” is not very precise.
Indeed, hypothetical reasoning may be based on false premises, in which case it is hard to
see what it would mean to say that it was “reasoned well”.64 One may mean merely that it
conforms to standard methods of reasoning, but we shall see the difficulties with this kind
of response below.
Due in part to these difficulties, mathematicians have developed various notions of formal
implication, with the intention that after performing hypothetical reasoning, there should
be some fact that can be concluded simply from the existence of the hypothetical reasoning.
If such a fact has the additional property that there are standard modes of reasoning via
which a person, believing the fact and being confronted with a new situation, may conclude
that the conclusion of their previous hypothetical reasoning is valid in the new situation,
then perhaps these standard modes of reasoning may be found to be less problematic than
the reasoning based on “saving time and effort” given above.
Two canonical examples are material implication and universal quantification. If P and
Q are two claims, then P is said to materially imply Q if either Q is false or P is true.
Now suppose that P and Q both have definite truth-values, and that there is reasoning
that yields Q as a conclusion using P as a hypothesis. If P is true and Q is false, then the
reasoning has true premises but a false conclusion, meaning that it must be flawed. Since
P and Q have definite truth-values, in all other cases P materially implies Q. So either
the reasoning is flawed, or P materially implies Q. If we hold the reasoning in our mind
and believe that there is no flaw in it, then we appear to be justified in concluding that
P materially implies Q, a fact which can then be used later if we discover that P is true
without reference to our previous hypothetical reasoning.
If the hypothetical reasoning can be formalized in an axiom system, then there is an
even better way to reach the conclusion that P materially implies Q. Namely, each claim
X that we make in our hypothetical reasoning may be replaced by the unconditional claim
“P materially implies X”. The hypothesis, P , can be justified because the fact that P has
a definite truth-value means that it materially implies itself. Reproducing the hypotheti-
cal reasoning as “material-conditional reasoning” yields the conclusion that P materially
implies Q.
In contrast to material implication, which is well-known for confusing beginning stu-
dents in logic, the concept of universal quantification appears to be relatively intuitive.
A universally quantified sentence is simply one of the form ‘Every member of category C
has property P ’. In other words, a universally quantified sentence is one that talks about
all members of a given category simultaneously. As we have argued above, any school of
64Philosophers distinguish between “sound” and “valid” reasoning; the difference is that “sound” rea-
soning is required to have true premises but “valid” reasoning isn’t. What we are doing is contesting the
preciseness of the concept of “valid” reasoning.
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thought except for ultrafinitism eventually yields the conclusion that there are categories
for which it does not make sense to talk about all members of the category simultaneously.
Let us call a category complete if it makes sense to talk about all members of that category
simultaneously. Suppose that C is a complete category, and that there is reasoning yielding
the conclusion that the object denoted by ‘x’ has property P , using the hypothesis that
‘x’ denotes a member of C. Then for every member z of C, it seems that the symbol ‘x’
could denote the object z, in which case our reasoning would yield the conclusion that z
has property P . Moreover, if every member of C is describable then we can strengthen
the case by saying that we could have made the convention that ‘x’ denotes z, rather than
talking about the symbol ‘x’ ’s ability to denote z in the abstract. This appears to yield
the conclusion that all members of C have property P , as long as there was nothing wrong
with our reasoning. If we later talk about a concrete member z of C, then we can use this
fact to conclude that z has property P without reference to our hypothetical reasoning.
Analogously to material implication, the case can be strengthened if the reasoning can be
formalized in an axiom system. This time, every claim that we make while hypothetically
reasoning is replaced by the claim that the previous claim holds for all members of the
given category.
There is another important way to make the notion of “reasoning well” mathematically
precise: one may say that one is reasoning well if one’s reasoning can be formalized in some
fixed axiom system. To be precise, a claim Q is said to be relatively provable from P with
respect to an axiom system A if A can prove Q using P as a hypothesis (see Appendix
B for a precise definition in the framework of this paper). The claim that Q is relatively
provable from P is equivalent to the assertion that a certain algorithm halts, namely the
algorithm that enumerates proofs of A using P as a hypothesis, and halts if it finds a proof
of Q. Thus it is uncontroversial (ignoring ultrafinitism) that claims of relative provability
are precise claims.
However, it is easy to show that no notion of relative provability can fully capture what
we mean by ‘reasoning well’. Namely, if we think that the axiom system A represents
valid reasoning, then we tend to also think that the axiom system A augmented with the
inference rule ‘if P is relatively provable from Q in A, and P is true, then Q is true’ also
represents valid reasoning. But if A is at least as strong as Peano arithmetic, then by
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem this new axiom system must be strictly stronger than A.
Let us conclude with a simple argument against those who would say that the intuitive
notion of “valid”, “logical”, or “unproblematic” reasoning is precise. Namely, one who
holds such a position must answer the question of whether the reasoning process “P is true
and P logically implies Q, so Q must be true” is an example of logical reasoning. If the no-
tion of “logical” reasoning is coherent and precise, then it is hard to see what is wrong with
this reasoning process, and consequently there is no obvious reason why it should not be
called “logical”. But if we allow this type of reasoning, then we encounter a contradiction
upon considering the following variation on the liar’s paradoxical sentence: ‘This sentence
logically implies that 0 = 1’. If the sentence is true, and if logical reasoning is valid, then it
appears that 0 = 1. Moreover, it appears that the previous sentence constitutes an instance
of logical reasoning, and thus the sentence logically implies that 0 = 1. But this is what
the sentence itself asserts, a contradiction. It is hard to see what the flaw in this argument
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could be if it is not the assumption that the notion of logical reasoning is precise.
Induction. The ambiguity inherent in the intuitive notion of “implication” becomes
especially relevant when considering the mathematical principle of induction, which we
formulate as follows. Note that we are careful to avoid universally quantifying over the
category of numbers, since we do not assume that this category is complete. Even if it
is complete, any philosophical position will have to deal with similar issues for its own
incomplete categories.
Principle D.1 (Principle of Induction for Numbers65). Let P be a property of numbers,
and suppose that there exists valid and precise reasoning yielding that the number n de-
noted by ‘n’ has property P , using the hypothesis that all numbers less than n have property
P , as well as the hypothesis that ‘n’ denotes a number. Finally, let N be a number. Then
N has property P .
The intuitive explanation for why the principle is legitimate is as follows. Suppose that
the hypotheses are true, i.e. that P is a property of numbers, and there is valid and precise
reasoning yielding that n has property P , using the hypothesis that all numbers less than
n have property P , where n is a free variable. Then we could make the convention that n
denotes 0; if we do this, then the hypotheses of the reasoning will be satisfied because there
are no numbers less than 0. Since the reasoning is valid and precise, it appears that this
implies that 0 has property P . Next we could change conventions so that n denotes 1; the
hypotheses of the reasoning are still satisfied because 0, the only number less than 1, has
property P . We could continue this process indefinitely, eventually getting to the number
N and showing that N has property P .
As formulated above, the most serious objection to the principle of induction is the fact
that the phrase ‘valid and precise reasoning’ cannot be made precise, as we demonstrated
above. This objection can be dealt with by fixing a precise notion of “valid and precise
reasoning” and formalizing the principle of induction for this precise notion. For example,
the special case of the principle of induction for material implication and universal quan-
tification suffices to formalize its applications to classical mathematics, since all sentences
in classical mathematics have definite truth-values.
However, such an approach is insufficient when dealing with largest number contests,
since the (vague) general principle of induction can be used to justify the validity of de-
scriptions of larger numbers than can be justified with only the principle of induction for
material implication.
Appendix E. More on the Busy Beaver contest
In the Introduction we saw that the axiomatic strategy for the Busy Beaver contest is
relatively epistemologically optimal. But is there a truly optimal strategy? Of course, if
we fix a bound on the size of the entries and assume the Principle of Limited Omniscience,
65There are similar principles of induction for ordinals (for gradualist set realists), truth-values (for
logicist set and number realists) and for complete categories (for philosophers who follow GC). The general
rule of thumb is that the most powerful principle of induction is the principle that discusses members of
an incomplete category.
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then one of the possible entries must in fact be the highest scoring one. Can we know
what it is? The following theorem shows that we can know some nontrivial facts about the
winning entry, while at the same time proving that the entry itself is elusive:
Theorem E.1. Let ω be the highest scoring entry to the Busy Beaver contest among all
entries of length at most n. Then the Kolmogorov complexity of ω is at least n−C, where
C is an absolute constant. In particular, the length of ω is at least n − C, and ω is C-
incompressible.
Here, we recall that the Kolmogorov complexity of a finite string ω is the length of the
shortest program that computes ω. A string is called C-incompressible if its length is at
most C plus its Kolmogorov complexity.
Proof. Let α be the shortest program that computes ω, and consider the algorithm β =‘Let
ω be the output of α, then let N be the output of ω, then return N + 1’. Then the length
of β is equal to the length of α plus some (small) constant C. Now, β is a valid entry
to the Busy Beaver contest whose score is greater than the score of ω. If the length of β
is at most n, this contradicts the definition of ω, so the length of β is at least n. Thus,
the length of α is at least n − C. Since α was arbitrary, this shows that the Kolmogorov
complexity of ω is at least n− C. The remaining two assertions follow from the fact that
the length of ω is at least its Kolmogorov complexity and at most n. 
Thus, the Busy Beaver Contest shares with the contests LNC(ST) and LNC(NT) the
property that the highest scoring entry has close to the maximum allowed length. However,
while Theorem 1.2 shows that there is an algorithm for computing nearly optimal entries
to LNC(ST) and LNC(NT) as a function of the maximum allowed length, Theorem E.1
shows that there is no such algorithm in the case of the Busy Beaver contest.
One might ask: even if there is no algorithm for computing the winner of the Busy
Beaver contest, maybe we can still figure it out using some other method of deduction?
Perhaps as the allowed length of the entries increases, we can spend more time thinking
about how to determine what is the highest scoring entry. However, this idea seems to be
based on a misunderstanding of the nature of deductive reasoning. If we specify an axiom
system in which our reasoning can be encoded, then any entry we can prove is valid will be
dominated by the axiomatic strategy corresponding to our axiom system, and is therefore
not optimal.
Appendix F. Contra the intersective definition
It is worth taking some time to correct a common misunderstanding regarding the con-
ceptual status of the notion of a category generated by production rules. This misunder-
standing arises from the way in which this notion is formalized in the language of set theory.
Namely, if S is a set, then the subset of S generated by a given list of production rules R
is defined to be the intersection of all subsets of S that are closed under the production
rules of R.66 It seems to be a common belief that this “intersective” definition is somehow
“more rigorous” or “more precise” than the intuitive notion of a category generated by
66A set is closed under a list of production rules if it is not possible to add new members to the set by
applying the production rules.
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production rules. Even worse, some people may even think that the intersective definition
is conceptually accurate, i.e. that it somehow describes what we really mean when we talk
intuitively about categories generated by production rules. A few points should suffice to
counter this view:
• Regarding one definition being “more precise” than another, it appears that the
only reason people think this is because the concept that the intersective definition
depends on, i.e. the concept of a set, has a well-known standard axiomatization,
whereas the natural axiomatizations (in various contexts) of the concept of a defini-
tion by production rules are less well-known. But there is nothing unrigorous about
these other axiomatizations, nor are they at all arbitrary.
• A serious threat to the conceptual accuracy of the intersective definition comes
from the proof that the intersective definition is equivalent to the intuitive notion
(in cases where the intersective definition applies). Namely, this proof depends on
the conceptual validity of the intuitive notion in a crucial way: to show that every
element of the set given by the intersective definition is in fact eventually generated
by the production rules, one must use the fact that there is a set consisting of
all objects eventually generated by the production rules. (This set is a member
of the collection of subsets being intersected, so it contains the set given by the
intersective definition.) It seems to me that most other proofs showing that two
given notions are the same do not use the conceptual validity of the notions being
proven equivalent in the same way (for example, the above proof does not appear
to me to depend on the conceptual validity of the intersective definition).
• An obvious threat to the conceptual accuracy of the intersective definition is that it
seems to be perfectly coherent to deny the validity of talking about sets at all while
still accepting the legitimacy of talking about categories generated by production
rules. In fact, all number realists seem to do this, since the category of natural
numbers is ordinarily understood as being generated by production rules (namely
0 and the successor operation).
• On the other hand, even set realists appear to accept the validity of at least some
recursive definitions that cannot be restated in terms of the intersective definition.
Namely, many set realists accept the language of classical set theory as precise,
even though the recursive definition of truth for classical set theory does not make
sense according to an intersective concept of recursion.67 While there may be good
reasons for set realists to deny that the language of classical set theory is precise,
it seems that the recursive nature of its notion of truth is not one of them.
Thus, I will take it as a given that definitions of categories in terms of production rules are
precise, and I will not argue the point further.
67That is, unless we accept the notion of “proper classes” as legitimate and on a par with the notion of
sets. But few set realists appear willing to do this, for reasons to be discussed below.
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Appendix G. Glossary
As the subject matter of this paper has been the concepts of language, truth, reference,
and preciseness, it has been particularly important to use precise language regarding these
concepts. Below, I describe to some extent how I have been using various words.
• A language is a convention specifying methods to be used for expressing and com-
municating thought. Languages can be either spoken or written (or they may use
some other medium), but in this paper we mostly concentrate on written languages,
which stipulate that thoughts are to be expressed by writing down strings. A string
consists of symbols (marks which can be reliably distinguished from each other)
arranged sequentially. Words, phrases, sentences, and mathematical formulas and
expressions are all examples of strings.68
This non-technical use of the word ‘language’ should be contrasted with a different
usage common in mathematical logic: the word ‘language’ is often used to mean “a
set of strings”. While languages in the sense of this paper are usually associated
with sets of strings of symbols, they are not fully described by them in the sense that
a language always includes conventions for how it should be used (and not merely
mentioned). These conventions are typically of the form “A certain mental concept
should be expressed in the language in a certain way”. Obviously, the notion of a
language in the sense of this paper cannot be made mathematically precise.
It is worth noting that although axiom systems are in some sense conventions
for how a language should be used, a set of strings together with a formal axiom
system still does not count as a language in the sense of this paper, since the
conventions do not specify methods for communicating thought, but rather methods
for manipulating symbols. On the other hand, if we start with a language and then
add an axiom system, then the axiom system can sometimes be thought of as
being a part of the language in the sense that it corresponds to the convention
that the language should be interpreted in a way such that the axiom system is
valid, i.e. we must determine whether or not any given way of interpreting the
language is compatible with the axiom system, and reject those interpretations that
are incompatible. Such a convention may increase the preciseness of a language
which was previously imprecise, though it may also simply be an expression of
intuition about concepts that were already precise.
• Languages generally specify that their users should communicate thought by mak-
ing utterances, which can then be thought of as objects in their own right. In
written languages, the utterances consist of strings of symbols. For the purposes of
this paper we do not distinguish between “complete” utterances (such as sentences
and mathematical formulae) and “partial” utterances (such as words, phrases, and
mathematical expressions). We do, however, group complete and partial utterances
into the following categories:
– A term, name, or representation is the kind of utterance that refers to, rep-
resents, denotes, or names an object, which is called its referent or value. In
68To guarantee that the symbols occurring in mathematical formulas have a canonical sequential ar-
rangement, it may be best to think of them as being specified by a sequence of LATEX commands.
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English, terms are generally singular noun phrases including determiners or
proper nouns, such as ‘the largest number’ or ‘Alice’. I do not consider plural
nouns and noun phrases (such as ‘numbers’ and ‘Alice and Bob’) to be terms,
nor singular nouns without determiners such as ‘number’. Mathematical terms
are often called “expressions”, but I will avoid this word both because it is
often used to mean “figure of speech”, and because it suggests a connection
with the word ‘express’, a connection which I find misleading.
– A sentence or claim is the kind of utterance that can be true or false. The
truth-value of a claim is the answer to the question of whether the claim is
true, if such an answer exists.
– A predicate is the kind of utterance that can be naturally combined with a
term to form a sentence.
– A definition is the kind of utterance that defines a term or class of terms in
the sense of either specifying a new convention or describing a pre-existing
convention for interpreting those terms. A definition is said to be conceptually
valid to the extent that it accurately describes a pre-existing convention.
– A description is the kind of utterance that describes, or expresses thoughts
about, an object. Descriptions may be more or less precise; particularly precise
descriptions are said to identify the object they describe. Terms are one kind
of description but not the only kind. In particular, for a general description it
does not make sense to talk about whether it refers to, represents, denotes, or
names an object.
Note: any description can be turned into a name via the phrase ‘the [entity]
described by [that description]’.
– “talk about”, “call”, “is called”, “is said to be”
• A notion or concept is a mental image or intuitive picture. Languages can express
concepts but cannot fully communicate them.
• A category is a mental “box” into which objects can be imaginarily placed. One can
define a category by specifying conventions regarding which objects should be placed
in such a box, though this use of the word ‘define’ should be carefully distinguished
from the use of the word ‘define’ for terms. For example, the “category of natural
numbers” is defined by the convention that natural numbers should be placed in
the box. An object which users of the language should place in the box (according
to convention) is said to be a member of the category.
• A collection is a category whose members are required to be members of a second
“reference” category (such as the category of natural numbers).
• The word ‘set’ will be used in this paper in two different ways:
– (a) a set is a pre-existing mind-independent object which may contain other
objects as members;
– (b) a set is a collection (as defined above) which is defined precisely enough
that every member of the reference category either is or is not a member of the
collection.
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• A class is a collection of sets according to usage (a), i.e. a collection whose reference
category is the category of sets. This matches the standard meaning of the word
‘class’ in mathematical logic.
Note that categories, collections, classes, and sets according to usage (b) are all
mind-dependent objects, whereas sets according to usage (a) are mind-independent
objects.
• A person may translate the utterances of one language into another language, by
making new utterances which express the same concepts. In this case, the new ut-
terance is called a translation or transcription of the original utterance, and is said
to transcribe and reproduce (but not translate) the original utterance. Metonymi-
cally, the language of the new utterance is also said to transcribe and reproduce the
language of the original utterance.
• An utterance is precise to the extent that it is incapable of being misinterpreted or
reinterpreted by thinkers following the conventions of the language it is embedded
in. This definition is somewhat circular since the answer to the question of whether
thinkers are in fact following the conventions of a language depends on how well-
defined or precise those conventions are. Nevertheless, a fundamental human drive
is to clarify conventions in order to make them more precise, and preciseness can
be understood as the extent to which we have succeeded at this goal.
The concept of preciseness is in general too vague to be used without an additional
qualifier, such as a qualifier describing what purpose the utterance is precise enough
for. Some of the qualified notions of preciseness we have used in this paper are
‘precise enough to have a definite truth-value’ (also called definite), ‘precise enough
to apply induction’, ‘precise enough that we can say exactly what it would mean for
the claim to be true’ (also called simply precise).
• A sentence is called intelligible or coherent (or meaningful?) if it is precise enough
that we can say at least to some extent what it would mean for the sentence to be
true, even if we cannot do so exactly.
• A thinker justifies a claim by describing a reasoning process that might lead a reader
to reason in that way and thus endorse the justification and consequently believe
the claim.
• A method of reasoning is a strategy for reasoning, while a mode of reasoning is
only a way in which people reason, regardless of whether or not it follows a definite
strategy.
• A thinker gives, writes, formulates, or states a claim or chain of reasoning by uttering
it, while he formalizes or codifies a claim or chain of reasoning by formulating a claim
or chain of reasoning in a precise language which captures the intuitive meaning of
the original claim or chain of reasoning. Claims and chains of reasoning in precise
languages can be translated into other precise languages. However, we will not call
this ‘formalization’ because it is not making it more formal, it is preserving the
degree of formality. Instead, we will call it reproduction or transcription.
• A person gives, writes, or encodes an algorithm by describing it in sufficient detail
that it could be implemented.
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• I follow the standard convention that if φ is a string, then the string that results
from enclosing φ in single quotes (with whitespace padding if necessary) is a proper
noun referring to φ. For example, if we let φ = ‘red’, then the string which would
be printed as
‘red’
(i.e. the string ‘ ‘red’ ’) is a proper noun referring to the word ‘red’. So for example,
‘the word ‘red’ has three letters’ is a grammatically valid sentence.
If the string φ contains a substring ψ which is a term referring to a string θ, then
I may modify the above convention to stipulate that the string ‘ ‘φ’ ’, instead of
referring to φ, refers to the string that results from replacing ψ with θ in φ. For
example, if we let ψ = ‘red’ and φ = ‘ψ ψ’, then the string ‘ ‘ψ ψ’ ’ may refer to the
string ‘red red’ instead of to the string ‘ψ ψ’. This abuse of notation can hopefully
be determined easily from context. Note that I have used it already once in this
paragraph.
I use double quotes much more loosely and do not follow any precise convention
regarding them.
• A language is classical if it follows the conventions of classical predicate calculus.
We take one of these conventions to be the assumption that every syntactically valid
sentence of the language is either true or false. A language can be classical even if
this assumption is not valid, as long as making the assumption is a requirement for
using the language.
• A language is proposition/term if it follows the conventions described in Appendix
A. Every classical language is proposition/term, but not conversely.
• A proposition/term language is selfmeta if it is capable of transcribing its own
metalanguage (see §A.2).
• A program is a description of an algorithm written in a programming language.
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